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ABSTRACT
Greece and Turkey have been recorded in History as implacable enemies. This enmity 
deemed their relations in a virtual state of cold war, despite their military alliance in 
the NATO framework. Nevertheless, during the last 10 years the bilateral relations 
gained another, more positive side . that of trade relations . Despite the negative 
developments politically, the business communities of the two countries managed to 
establish trade relations and to create charmels of economic contact and 
communication. The initial aim was to show to everyone that Greece and Turkey 
could cooperate. Today, within the framework of the Greek-Turkish rapprochement this 
trade relation is evolving in a significant cooperation in all economic areas and in 
concrete projects of joint business action. This Master’s thesis examines the economic 
relations of Greece and Turkey, outside and inside the framework of the “ Greek- 
Turkish Dialogue P r o c e s s I t  also detects the basic orientations of the policies and 
the economies of the two countries, as well as the obstacles and the prospects of the 
economic cooperation. It is concluded that Greece and Turkey except, potential enemies, 
can also be excellent potential partners.
ÖZET
Dünya tarihinin defterinde Yunanistan ve Türkiye iki ulaşmaz düşman olarak yer 
almıştır Her iki ülke de NATO’nun müttefikleri olduktan sonra bile, bu düşmanlık bu 
ülkelerin ikili ilişkilerinde tam bir “ soğuk savaş” ortamı yaratmıştır. Buna rağmen, son 
10 yıldır iki ülkenin ilişkilerinde ortaya çıkan ve giderek güç kazanan bir olumlu 
gelişme gözlenmektedir: ekonomik ilişkiler ve bu ilişkilerin gelişip güçlenerek öne 
çıkardığı yumuşama havası Olumsuz politik koşullara rağmen, iki ülkenin işadamlan 
gelecek için de umut veren bir ticaret köprüsü kurmayı başarmışlardır Böylece, 
işadamlan Türkiye ve Yunanistan’ın pek çok alanda ortak çıkartan olduğunu ve bu 
çıkarlar doğrultusunda iki ülkenin ekonomik işbirliğinin mümkün olduğunu 
göstermişlerdir. Nitekim, bugün Türk-Yunan yakınlaşması çerçevesinde ekonomik 
işbirliği olanaklan da önemli ve somut projelerle geliştirilmektedir. Bu tez Türk-Yunan 
ekonomik ilişkilerinin ulaştığı bu son aşamayı değerlendirmekte; bu aşamada ortaya 
çıkan engellerin ve sorunlann yanı sıra fırsatları ve olanaklan araştırmaktadır. Bu 
araştırmanın ortaya çıkardığı sonuç şudur: iki ülkenin ceoğrafi konumlan ve ticaret 
potansiyelleri sürüp gelen tarihsel düşmanlığın ötesinde pek çok olumlu işbirliği 
olanaklanna ve iki ülkenin de çıkarlannı büyütecek ticari ortaklıklara zemin 
oluşturmaktadır.
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INTRODUCTION
The Southeastern Mediterranean region has been the birthplace not only of
great civilizations, but also of great disputes . One of these, the Greek-Turkish debate
has provoked worldwide interest and given its own stigma to the twentieth century.
The relations between Turkey and Greece from 1963 to late 1999-despite the NATO 
membership of both countries- were in a virtual state of cold w ar. In the course 
of 35 years, there have been cycles of relaxation, and even rapprochement, succeeded 
by cycles of tension occasionally reaching peaks of crisis (July-August 1974, March 
1987, January 1996 and February 1999) bordering on the threshold of warfare. From 
the perspective of Greece, the continued occupation by Turkey’s armed forces of 36% 
of the republic of Cyprus and a number of escalating Turkish claims seeking to alter 
the territorial status-quo in the Aegean have been the iceberg that sinks any effort to 
improve Greek-Turkish relations, The Turkish response has been to assert that the 
Greek-Cypriots are the ones who had been acting in a revisionist manner while the 
Greeks attempt to revert the Aegean Sea to a “Greek Lake
The myth of “the eternal Greek-Turkish enmity” seemed to suffer a lethal blow after 
the earthquakes in Turkey (August 1999) and Greece (September 1999). Both societies 
reacted spontaneously and genuinely to each other’s plight and both governments 
embarked on a bilateral dialogue for achieving rapprochement, focusing on issues of 
low politics (commerce, environment, terrorism, education). The two countries -  at the
Theodore A. Couloumbis / ‘Dealing with the Greek-Turkish tension,” Athens News , (6 October 1999).
sunrise of the 2T‘ century-appear to have reached a point of mutual fatigue and a 
small window of opportunity may allow them to move forward with a peace process.
It is true that both sides accept the premise that a Greek-Turkish war would be an 
unacceptable option; moreover, it would be an act of madness that would render the 
region “the conflict area” of the planet , sending strong warning signals to foreign and 
domestic investors. There would be enormous loss of life and material destruction. 
Furthermore, an alleged Greek-Turkish confrontation would have a deadly impact on 
the credibility and effectiveness of NATO - currently in a state of post-Cold War 
enlargement ^
The wars in ex-Yugoslavia and the natural disasters that have attacked the 
region are driving home an important lesson; tragedy knows no borders and it cannot 
be artificially contained. Greece and Turkey must understand that mutual benefits 
can outweigh any advantage of continued enmity and suspicion. Both of them must 
look for the best ways or conditions for a peaceful co-existence and provide in a 
methodical way a policy of step-by-step normalization of bilateral relations.
A bilateral dialogue on issues/areas of low politics, such as the development of 
trade and economic collaboration combined with educational-cultural contacts and 
exchanges, can lead to mutual benefits. Efforts should be channeled into the area 
where non-antagonistic activities will contribute to the creation of an atmosphere of 
confidence between the two neighbors.
A few steps towards these non-antagonistic projects and cooperation schemes have
Thanos Veremis & Duygu Sezer, “Greek-Turkish Peace : Utopia or Reality.” Kathimerini. (3 October 1999),
already been taken: the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), the Southeast 
Cooperative Initiative, the Balkan Multilateral Cooperation Process and the Greek- 
Turkish Business Council (established in 1988 after Davos meetings, concerning the 
bilateral economic relations) offer some good examples of how Greek-Turkish 
cooperative initiatives can be expanded in a Balkan framework through the 
establishment of non-govemmental organizations and the involvement of the private 
sector in bilateral settings
At the threshold of the 21*' century with a Turkey that takes its first steps toward a 
metamorphosis necessary for the European Union membership, the two countries must 
learn how to cooperate also in the EU’s framework, how to overcome their mutual 
distrust and how to co-exist peacefully.
With all this in mind, this thesis concentrates on the fields of low politics, 
like bilateral trade and economic cooperation that have the potential to open a 
path toward reconciliation. There is room for Greek-Turkish cooperation but it is 
limited. The thorny issues of high politics (in Cyprus and in the Aegean) carmot be 
easily bypassed. Can business relations bring forward any solutions to the slippery 
ground of political disputes ? What are the problems and the prospects emerging on 
trade between Greece and Turkey ? To these cardinal questions the thesis attempts to 
come up with some appropriate answers. Greek-Turkish relations are on the threshold 
of a new era . At the turn of the 20'*' century Greece and Turkey decided to resolve 
old enmities and to ease off the tension by embarking on bilateral economic
 ^Theodore Couloumbis & Thanos Veremis, “Greek Foreign Policy in a post-Helsinki Setting,” Athens News. 
(18 January 2000).
cooperation. This Master’s thesis by exploring the prospects for economic cooperation 
between the two countries attempts to demonstrate that a thriving economic relation 
and gradually developed economic interests have the potential to improve the climate 
in Greek-Turkish relations and to bring not only profit for both sides but also the 
necessaiy bed for the development of social and political synergy.
The thesis is composed of four chapters. Following the introduction, the first chapter 
lays the emphasis on the so-called Greek-Turkish dispute, by presenting both side’s 
views on the subject. The second chapter records the “travelogue” of the Greek- 
Turkish rapprochement triggered off by the Kosovo crisis and the earthquakes of 
1999. The third chapter presents the political and economic profiles of the two 
countries in order to detect the structure and the main goals of the two societies. 
The fourth chapter examines the past and the future of the Greek-Turkish economic 
relations in order to provide adequate conclusions of the research and 
proposals that may be necessary for the peace process to continue unfolding.
The outline of the First Chapter concerning Greek-Turkish disputes is based mainly on 
secondary materials written in Greek and English by Greek scholars. The outline of 
the Fourth Chapter concerning the Greek-Turkish Economic Cooperation is based 
chiefly on primary sources, such as interviews with both countries’ business circles 
and politicians.
CHAPTER 1
THE GREEK-TURKISH DISPUTE: THE POINTS AT ISSUE
l.i. Introductory Remarks
The most salient interstate conflict in the Mediterranean is the Greek-Turkish one. 
This conflict has five important implications. First, it affects NATO operation and 
strategies. Second, it affects the external relations and enlargement process of the EU. 
Third, it makes the resolution of the Cyprus problem impossible . Fourth, it 
destabilizes the Balkan security environment. Fifth, it affects the relations between EU 
and Turkey. The Greek-Turkish juxtaposition constitutes a peculiar long-drawn-out 
crisis in the form of an extended conflict. Indeed, a run of frictions 
between the two countries on bilateral ( Cyprus, Aegean) and multilateral ( NATO/EU) 
issues have been the cardinal characteristic of a strained relation, which until recently 
remained as strained as it was during the Cold W ar. In the post-Cold War era all 
questions touching the Greek-Turkish relations keep on focusing on the possibility of 
a development of less antagonistic relations between two countries, which - due to 
geography - are required to co-exist
■* Agelos Sirigos “The Greek-Turkish Problems, the Appeal to the International Court o f Justice and the 
Stability in the Aegean,” in Greece and Turkey in the Post-Cold War E ra , edited by Cr, K.Gialouridis, 
Sideris Publications, Athens 1999, p.403.
Greeks and Turks have been acquainted for a long tim e. After the capture of 
Constantinople by Sultan Mehmet II in 1453, Greece remained under the power of the 
Ottomans until the War of Independence (1821-30). After a bloody Greek-Turkish War 
fought between 1919 and 1922,the Treaties of Lausanne were concluded in 1923, 
year of the establishment of the Turkish Republic. These treaties are the basis of the 
Greek-Turkish relations. They represent the end of armed Greek-Turkish disputes 
which lasted almost a whole century, and they herald the drawing up of a definitive 
border line in the East
Turkey considers the Lausanne Treaty as a political settlement which also establishes a 
regime for an overall balanced settlement of the disputed issues between the two 
countries in the Aegean region f" Turkey believes that problems with Greece especially 
in the Aegean are not of an economic or a legal nature, but of a political one, and 
proposes to settle her differences with Greece through dialogue and negotiations 7
On the other hand, Greece refuses to hold a dialogue on matters of sovereign rights 
which are not subject to negotiation. Greece is of the opinion that there are no 
Greek-Turkish differences, in the narrow sense of the word, but rather “one-sided 
demands” made by Turkey against Greece. The only difference which needs to be 
regulated is the delimitation of the Aegean Continental Shelf, and Greece has been 
proposing since 1975 that the two countries jointly apply to the International Court of
’ Ibid., p.405.
^Dr, Şükrü Elekdağ (retired ambassador) “Current issues in Turkish-Greek relations” Strateji.Ol?. 1998/99, 
p. 394,466.
Avrasya-Center Balkan Research Group “Yunanistan Dosyası,” Avrasya Dosyası, vol.4, No. 1-2, (spring- 
summer 1998), p .73,74.
Justice for the matter to be resolved. Turkey has repeatedly declined Greece’s offer 
and insists on an overall dialogue.
Governing the Greek-Turkish relations are perceptions that each side nurtures for the 
other. In terms of the Aegean, Turkey believes that Greece wants to transform it into 
a “Greek Lake” , while Greece believes that Turkey aspires to mzike inroads in the 
area at the expense of Greek sovereignty in the Eastern Aegean islands. On the 
whole, Greece’s policy is centered on defending the territorial status quo, while Turkey 
appears to be challenging certain legal features that have remained unchallenged for a 
long tim e.
This fundamental disagreement between the two neighbors is also fueled by the 
Cyprus crisis, a crisis that began in the 1950’s and put an end to the 
“Lausannic” atmosphere of friendship and cooperation between Turkey and Greece, 
which lasted for three decades, and which had been crowned by the personalities of 
Kemal Atatürk and Elevtherios Venizelos.*
1.2.The Cyprus issue
Cyprus is the third largest island in the Mediteiranean with a long history whose 
origins go back nine thousands years. Its geographical position and its natural
* Vyron Theodoropoulos (retired ambassador) “Oi Tourkoi kai Emeis”(We and the Turks,) Fytrakis Press, 
Athens 1988, p.267-68
resources have always made it a target for conquerors, so it is not surprising that the 
Cyprus problem, simple in its essence, has over the course of time been complicated 
as a result of changing circumstances, international developments and foreign 
interventions. There is also a consensus among analysts that peace in Cyprus is a 
major factor in the efforts to secure political and economic stability in the Eastern 
Mediterranean basin /
Occupied by Great Britain in 1878 and a British colony after 1925,this island was 
no exception to the rule of anti-colonial struggle that affected the British Empire 
following the end of the Second World W ar. In 1960, Cyprus was declared an 
independent Republic on the basis of the Zunch-London agreements . However, the 
constitution that was imposed on the Cypriot people contained divisive provisions 
which encouraged confrontation and dissent between the Greek and the Turkish 
Cypriots(80% and 18% of the population respectively). In addition,the rights granted 
to Britain, Greece and Turkey embroiled the young state in the antagonisms among 
the great powers and in the clashes between various economic and strategic interests in 
the region.'®
Between 1963 and 1974, Cyprus was mainly a problem of intercommunal strife and 
of peacekeeping efforts of the United Nations force deployed throughout the island as 
well as a source of friction between Greece and Turkey. In the late 1963, the Cypriot 
President, Archbishop Makarios, proposed several constitutional amendments to 
streamline some of the nation’s unwieldy institutions and procedures. Among these
’ Vagelis Coufoudakis “To Kypriako, oi Ellinotourkikes Sheseis kai oi Megaies Dunameis”(The Cyprus 
Issue, The Greek-Turkish relations and The Great Powers,) in Ellinotourkikes Sheseis 1923-1987(Greek- 
Turkish Relations 1923-1987.1 edited by ELIAMEP, Gnosi Publications, Athens, 1991, p. 218.
10 Ib id , p. 222.
were some proposed changes to curb the power of veto of the Turkish community in 
legislation and to whittle down the representation of the Turks in governmental 
services to a level more representative of the total Cypriot population. The Turkish 
Cypriots rejected these amendments and fighting between the two communities 
erupted. Intercommunal clashes intensified in 1967 and Ankara threatened to intervene 
to protect the Turkish C5^ riot community." The United States worrying about the 
situation evolving, warned Turkey of dire consequences in case Turkey intervened 
unilaterally. In 1968 intercommunal talks under the UN auspices began in Beirut. 
They continued inconclusively until 1974, the Turks demanding and the Greeks 
rejecting a bi-zonal federation with a weak central government. It remained for the 
1974 Cyprus crisis to precipitate the most serious damage to the relations between 
Greece and Turkey
On July 15 1974 the Greek-Cypriot military forces,on orders from the military junta 
ruling Greece at that time, launched a coup aimed at assassinating Makarios and 
establishing enosis (union with Greece). Nikos Sampson was proclaimed president of 
Cyprus and five days later, on July 20 1974, Turkish forces landed at Kyrenia with 
the expressed aim of overturning Sampson’s government. United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 353 called for a ceasefire, the withdrawal of foreign troops, and 
the initiation of negotiations. Two Geneva conferences were unable to reach a 
settlement, and as a result, a second operation was launched by the Turkish armed 
forces from 14-17 August 1974 which consolidated the Turkish foothold,left Turkey 
in the occupation of 37% of Cyprus (i.e. the northern part of the island), and thus
” Andrew Borowiec “The Mediterranean Feud,” Praeger Publishers, New Y ork, 1983,p. 89-90. 
'^ “History o f Cyprus” Encyclopaedia Britannica(http://www.britannicacom)
further hardened the positions of the adversaries. Greece withdrew from NATO for the 
course of 6 years, while Turkey responded to the arms embargo(1974-78) imposed by 
the US Congress by temporarily closing 26 US military installations. The Cyprus 
imbroglio culminated one more time on 15 November 1983, when the Turkish- 
Cypriot side made a umlateral declaration of independence and adopted the name 
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.'^Resolutions 541 (1983) and 550(1984) of the 
UN Security Council denounced the unilateral declaration and all the following 
divisive action, declared them to be illegal and invalid and called for them to be 
withdrawn immediately. They simultaneously appealed to all states not to recognize 
the so-called “state” . Its independence was recognized only by Turkey.
With Cyprus, attitudes vis-a-vis the status quo are adversed. The Turkish Cypriots and 
Turkey are not entirely unhappy with the status quo,while the Greek Cypriots would 
very much like to see a reunited Cyprus. Security considerations weigh heavily in 
each side’s willingness to find a solution. The Turkish Cypriots feel secure with 
35,000 Turkish troops in the North while the Greek Cypriots are insecure for the same 
reason . In that framework, Greek Cypriots have proposed the gradual reduction of 
arms with the aim of the eventual complete demilitarization of the island, a proposal 
that has been welcomed by the European Parliament (28 March 1996). As such 
demilitarization was rejected by Ankara, the Greek side accepted in principle the idea 
presented by the US of a no-fly zone over Cyprus. Given Turkey’s reluctance to 
accept this idea, the vulnerability of the Greek-Cypriot airspace and its constant
'^James Brown “Delicately Poised Allies: Greece and Turkey,” Brassey’s Ltd. (U K ), 1991,p. 8-9.
K.P. Oikonomides “Zitimata Ellinikis Eksoterikis politikis” (Issues o f Greek Foreign Policy,) Sakkoulas 
Publications, Athens 1993, p. 112-13.
See Thanos Veremis “Greek-Turkish problems; An Inter-Alliance Conflict,” Conference Papers series, 
vol. 1 , 1999, published by the Lynn L. Leimnitzer Center for NATO and E.U Studies, p.5.
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violation, the Greek-Cypriots decided to purchase and deploy on the island the 
Russian S-300 ground-to-air defense missiles. Turkey opposed this option and 
threatened to destroy the Russian missiles. Turkish threats provoked a new wave of 
tension between Athens and Ankara and the crisis has been avoided with the decision 
of the Greek-Cypriots, supported by the Greece, not to deploy missiles in Cyprus.
Turkey also opposes the joint defense doctrine of Greece and Cyprus. In 1994, Greece 
and the Greek-Cypriots announced the Doctrine of the Joint Defense Area. According 
to this doctrine, as long as Turkey maintained an occupation force of more than 
30,000 troops in Cyprus, Greek and Greek-Cypriot defenses would increase their level 
of cooperation. In this context, any attack against the South would constitute a casus 
belli (a cause of war) for Greece. Greece believes that this doctrine reflects the 
readiness of the Greek government to abide by its responsibilities as a guarantor 
power under the terms of the 1960 Agreements, and that the initiative in progress has 
a clear defensive character and aims at preventing or addressing any offensive
actions.17
The key factor in the Cypriot strategy has been the pursuit of full EU membership. 
In 1990, Nicosia applied for full membership and in 1995 the decision was taken to 
begin accession negotiations, which eventually started in 1998. The prospect of EU 
membership has raised Greek Cypriot hopes that this might inhibit Turkey’s 
willingness to use force in the future and that membership might facilitate the much- 
desired reunification of the divided island. The Turkish Cypriots and Turkey believe
Ibid.,p. 14,15.16
'^Thanos Dokos “Greek Security Doctrine in the Post-Cold War Era,” THESIS. vol. 11. N o.2 .( summer 
1998), p.32.
11
that such a development would remove Cyprus from Turkey’s strategic control and 
would enhance the position of the Greek majority. Turkey has maintained that Cyprus 
could not join the EU without the consent of the Turkish Cypriots, or before Turkey 
itself is admitted '*
The UN’s efforts aiming at a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem persist 
with a round of talks(December 1999 New York/February 2000 Geneva) between the two 
communities in order to bring the process to a successful conclusion, while at the 
same time Cyprus continues the accession negotiations with the E U . The European 
Council at the Helsinki Summit (December 1999)-where Turkey was nominated as a 
candidate state- underlined that a political settlement would facilitate the accession of 
Cyprus to the European Union. If no settlement has been reached by the completion 
of accession negotiations, the Council’s decision on accession will be made without 
the settlement precondition
1.3. The Aegean Dispute
The Cyprus crisis also opened the Pandora’s box of the Aegean and one after 
another the contested issues popped out in quick succession. Besides the Cyprus issue, 
three other critical questions gave rise to serious tension between Greece and Turkey:
'* Andreas Theofanous “Cyprus and the EU,” Sideris Publications, Athens 1999, p.399.
’’ Jurgen Reuter “Reshaping Greek-Turldsh relations,” (January 2000J.thttD:///www.eliamep.gr/opinionsi. p.9.
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l)the Aegean continental shelf; 2) control of the air traffic over the sea ;3) the 
fortífícation of the east Aegean islands; 4) the allocation of operational responsibility 
of the Aegean and its air space within the f irew o rk  of NATO. On these essential 
bilateral issues, the two parties have fundamentally disagreed about the way to resolve 
their differences . Greece, in general, has looked to international law and has advocated 
recourse to international bodies, and essentially considers the continental shelf issue 
negotiable. Turkey, viewing the Aegean as a unique situation for which durable 
solutions must be political rather than legal, has generally proposed settlement through 
bilateral negotiations, and seeks resolution of the full range of issues
1 J .l .  The Continental Shelf
The Aegean Sea, a semi-closed sea scattered with more than 3.000 islands and 
islets, is considered by many to be Greek. Yet international law and treaties signed 
by Greece and Turkey point to a different reality. About 43.5% of the Aegean’s 
surface falls within Greece’s territorial waters, and another 7.5% within Turkey’s . The 
remaining 49% of the Aegean constitutes international waters and belongs to no single
nation.21
But nearly every island and islet in the Aegean Sea belongs to Greece. Greece 
adheres to the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf, which provides islands with 
a continental shelf area, and has signed the 1982 United Nations Convention on the
Thanos Veremis “Greek Security ; Issues and Politics,” in Greece and Turkev:Adversitv in Alliance. edited by 
Jonathan Alford , Deputy Director ,IISS 1984, ADELFI LIBRARY 12, Gower L td ., p.5.
James Brown “Delicately Poised Allies: Greece and Turkey,” Brassey’s Ltd. (UK), 1991, p.lO.
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Law of the Sea that reaffirms Athens’ position. This would place nearly the entire 
Aegean seabed into Greek possession — a development Turkey deems unacceptable. 
Turkey supports neither convention and describes the Aegean Sea as a special case 
outside of standard definitions set forth in the Law of the Sea convention. Turkey 
considers her continental shelf to be an extension of the Asia Minor land mass into 
the sea to the west of certain Greek islands, to which she denies possession of a 
continental shelf. It follows that the islanders can only exploit the seabed of their 
islands within the territorial sea limit of six miles Both Greece and Tinkey 
currently claim six-mile territorial seas off their respective Aegean coasts, but Greece, 
following concept of the United Nations Law of the Sea Treaty, reserves the right to 
increase its limit to 12 miles. In the case of such an extension the Greek share of 
the sea would climb to about 71% (currently 43.5%) and that of Turkey to about 9% 
(currently 7.5%). This position is unacceptable to Ankara, which would consider a 
Greek declaration of this kind a casus belli (a cause of war).
Turkey insists that the question of the continental shelf should be solved through 
political negotiations, based on the principles of equity and equality, between the two 
interested parties, while Greece believes that the dispute necessitates a settlement by 
international legal arbitration (International Court of Justice).
In 1978 at the Montreux meeting,both sides agreed to discuss the problem and to 
abstain from activities ( such as magnetometric studies for discovering oil in disputed
^^Thanos Veremis “Greece and NATO iContinuity and Change,” in NATO’s Southern Allies .edited by John 
Chipman , Routledge London & N .Y ., 1988, p. 275,
Andrew Wilson “The Aegean Dispute,” in Greece and Turkey : Adversity in Alliance, edited by Jonathan 
Alford, Deputy Director, HSS 1984, ADELPHI LIBRARY 12 , Gower Ltd. ,p. 102-3.
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Through the years, both Ankara and Athens have explored for oil in the region and 
tensions between them have been vexing. In March 1987 a new history of the 
continental shelf was wntten. In a period of two weeks, the political situation so 
deteriorated that the military forces of both nations were placed on a high state of 
alert. It took the personal intervention of both Prime Ministers (Papadreou and Ozal) to 
diffuse the state of affairs. Each government pledged to refrain from further 
provocative activities in the Aegean, Although bilateral discussions did not lead to a 
solution, they did at least lessen the possibility of a resort to violence.
areas ) which would cause friction between them .
This superficial calm lasted until January 1996, when a team of Turkish journalists 
removed the Greek flag from a barren islet of the Dodecanese complex and 
hoisted a Turkish one in its place . Greek soldiers replaced the Greek flag and Greece 
considered the affair closed until the Turkish government placed an official claim on 
that and many other Greek islets and commenced a confrontation that almost led to 
w ar. American mediation defused the crisis but yet another item, this time a territorial 
claim, was added to the overburdened agenda of the Greek-Turkish problems
U .2 . Air Traffic Control
While refusing to accept an extension of Greece’s territorial waters, Turkey pointed
See John Sitilides “Greek-Turkish Relations; The GepoIiticaJ Context,” ( November 1999) 
(http :///www westempolicy.org/publications/1999) ,p. 3.
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out that the existing six-mile limit should set the standard for Greek airspace, which 
since 1932 has extended four miles beyond the limit of Greece’s territorial sea.
A regional convention of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) in Paris 
decided in 1952 that the Aegean controlled airspace-oxcept the band of Turkish 
national airspace off the coast of Asia Minor- should form part of the Athens Flight 
Information Region (FIR) for air traffic control purposes. Civilian aircraft flying west 
was required to file flight plans and to report positions as they crossed the FIR 
boundary after leaving the coast of Turkey. Planes coming from the opposite direction 
were required to report to the control center in Istanbul as they entered the Turkish 
FIR . In other words ,this arrangement designated the Athens FIR to coincide with the 
sea and air boundaries separating Greece from Turkey. This resulted in Greek control 
of air traffic over most of the Aegean Sea.
Although Turkey worked with this arrangement for over 20 years, on 6 August 
1974, following its military operation in Cyprus, it unilaterally extended the Istanbul 
and Ankara FIRs to the middle of the Aegean (NOTAM 714). Greece protested and 
closed all corridors for international commercial flights over the Aegean (NOTAM 
1157). All international flights in the Aegean between the two countries were
suspended .25
In 1980, in the context of improving bilateral relations, Turkey withdrew her claim to 
air traffic rights in the eastern half of the Aegean and allowed the re-establishment of 
the pre-1974 FIRs . Subsequently, the air corridors were re-opened. Nonetheless, Greece
Agelos S. Giokaris "To Diethnes Nomiko Kathestos tou FIR Athinon”(The International Legal Status of 
Athens FIR,) in Trives stis Ellinotourkikes Sheseis IFrictions in the Greek-Turkish Relations! edited by 
ELIAMEP, Sideris Publications, Athens 1994, p. 20 ,22 .
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continues to protest against the constant violation of the ten mile limit of its airspace 
by Turkish fighters. Turkey, on the other hand, complains that Greece abuses its FIR 
rights and duties to restrict Turkish military aircraft and air force exercises over the 
high seas of the Aegean.
In short, Greece claims that it alone should control air operations over the 
Aegean and it cites its control of the Athens FIR to support this argument, while 
Turkey insists that air responsibilities in the area should be shared
1 3J . The Fortification of the East Aegean Islands
The most persistent Turkish demand in the Aegean is the demilitarization of the 
Greek islands of Samothrace, Lemnos, Lesvos, Chios, Samos, and the Dodecanese. 
Ankara views the fortification of these islands, as violation of the Lausanne Peace 
Treaty of 1923 and the Italian Peace Treaty of 1947 and interprets Greek East Aegean 
islands as a provocative action.
Greece has argued that Lemnos and Samothrace were relieved of their demilitarized 
status when Turkey was able to revise the regime governing the entire Straits region 
through the Montreux Convention of 1936 . The islands of Chios, Lesvos, and Samos 
have been fortified by Greece in response to Turkish threats and especially after the 
establishment of the Turkish Fourth Army (known as the Aegean Army) in 1975 based
26 James Brown “Delicately Poised Allies: Greece and Turkey” , Brassey’s (U K ), 1991 , p. 11.
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in Izmir. 27
The Aegean Army has been placed outside the command structure of NATO and 
because of its amphibious capacities, Greece believes that it has an aggressive rather 
than defensive mission. In the past Greece has repeatedly cancelled its participation in 
Aegean NATO exercises, refusing to accept the exclusion of the Lemnos airfield from 
NATO scenarios. Greece officially notified the presence of its forces on the island in 
the Defense Planning Questionnaire (DPQ) and asked that they be placed under NATO 
command but failed to override Turkey’s veto. In Turkish eyes this is essentially a 
ploy to force NATO and Turkey to recognize the militarisation of the island as legal, 
thereby weakening Turkey’s stance in relation to the entire range of contested Aegean
issues.28
13.4. Aegean Command and Control
Greece and Turkey also differ over NATO command and control responsibilities. 
Greece’s withdrawal from NATO’s military structure after the failure of the Alliance 
to react to the capture of northern Cyprus was more of a trial separation since the 
country remained in the political arm of the alliance. As soon as Greece expressed 
the willingness to reenter the military structure of NATO, reintegration attempts were 
vetoed by Turkey, which, having raised a claim over the reallocation of the Athens’ 
FIR, was in effect also demanding a reallocation of the operational control zones of
Vagelis Coufoudakis “Greek Political Attitudes Towards Turkey” in The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the 
t990’s. edited by Dimitri Constas, MACMILLAN PRESS, BONN, 1990, p. 42.
28 Brown, p. 14.
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the Aegean airspace.29
According to the pre-1974 arrangements, NATO had ceded the military control over 
the Aegean airspace (Greek and international sea waters) to Greek command. Any 
other arrangement would result in placing Greek territories under Turkish protection. 
Athens is opposed to the arrangements that have been in effect since Greece withdrew 
from the NATO military command in 1974. Since then, NATO’s air defense of the 
Aegean has been the responsibility of the sixth Allied Tactical Air Force (ATAF) 
based in Izmir, Turkey, and commanded by a Turkish general under the direction of
NATO commands in Naples, Italy.30
Attempts for a settlement package by the commanders of NATO have led to the 
establishment of a new allied army and airforce command (SEVENATAF) in Larissa, 
Greece (DPQ meetings, May/December 1992). Neither could this settlement solve any 
problems, since Greece maintains that decisions on the limitation of the operational 
control zones of the two headquarters (Izmir/Larissa) should precede the establishment 
of the SEVENATAF -  while all Greek governments have made clear that they cannot 
tolerate arrangements that would affect the airspace of the Greek islands-and Turkey 
wants to maintain its share of operational responsibility for half of the Aegean. 
Ankara does not believe that Greece has the capability or willingness to provide 
adequate coverage for Turkey’s Aegean coast
See Thanos Veremis “The Ongoing Aegean Crisis” , THESIS , vol. 1, No. 1( spring 1997), p.24.
See Brown , p. 15,
Anastasios Dimitrakopoulos “Ellinotourkikes Trives sto plaisio tou NATO”( Greek-Turkish Frictions in the 
NATO Framework) in Trives stis Ellinotourkikes SheseislFrictions in the Greek-Turkish Relations.) edited by 
ELIAMEP, Sideris Publications, Athens 1994, p. 59-62.
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CHAPTER II
ESCALATION AND DE-ESCALATION PERIODS
2.1. Chronicle of a De-escalation Foretold
In the beginning of 1999, when it came to light that the PKK (Kurdistan Workers 
Party) leader Ocalan was being provided shelter at the Greek Embassy in Nairobi, the 
Greek-Turkish relationship sank to a record low.
Abdullah Ocalan has been blamed by Turkish officials for the deaths of more than 
35,000 people, in a separatist campaign waged by the PKK against the Turkish Army 
since 1984 to achieve a Kurdish homeland in southeastern Turkey. Turkish special 
forces captured Ocalan in Nairobi on February 15 after he left the Greek Embassy 
where he had been hidden for 12 days. The infamous PKK leader Abdullah 
Ocalan had been expelled ft^ om Syria in October 1999 and he had sought political 
asylum in Italy over a two-month period. He left Italy on January 16 after his request 
for asylum was rejected and Western European governments failed to address or 
resolve the matter. He entered Greece illegally for the first time on January 29. In 
early February, when he entered Greece secretly for the second tim e, unable to find a 
European country that would take him in,the then Greek Foreign Minister Theodores 
Pángalos sent him to the Greek Embassy in Nairobi, while Greek authorities searched 
for an African country that would grant him political asylum. Athens said it provided
20
temporary refuge to Ocalan for humanitarian reasons.32
Following Greece’s sheltering of Ocalan, diplomatic tensions between Greece and 
Turkey reached their worst level since the 1996 crisis (see chapter 1, p. 15) Turkey 
threatened to bring Greece to trial at an international level, charging her on two 
counts ; first, that she was acting as a “terrorist state” and second, that she was 
refusing to declare that she is not a supporter of PKK. The Greek government 
maintained that the PKK remained illegal in Greece, and it forbade the opening of 
PKK offices in the country, a policy shared by Germany, France, and other leading 
European countries. The US State Department said that it disagreed with Greece’s 
handling of the Ocalan matter but rejected Turkey’s suggestion that Greece, a NATO 
ally, should be included in a list of countries supporting terrorism. The US asked both 
Greece and Turkey to tone down their verbal exchanges over the Ocalan matter to 
avoid further exacerbating existing tensions between the two countries
The Ocalan affair led to a crisis in the Greek government and then to the 
resignation of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Thedoros Pángalos. As a result, 
Georgios A. Papandreou, the former alternate foreign minister, became head of the 
Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs and with him came a noticeable change in 
Greek foreign policy towards Turkey. This change manifested itself during the 
Kosovo-crisis in the spring 1999.
Western Policy Center Regional report: Greece, vol. 4 , issue 2 , ( Fdjruary 1999), 
(http :///www. westempolicy.org).
Western Policy Center Regional report: Turkey, vol.4 , issue 2, (February 1999), 
(http.7//www. westempolicy.org).
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Contrary to suggestions by Western leaders that tensions between Greece and Turkey 
might escalate over the Kosovo crisis, the two countries worked together to 
coordinate aspects of providing humanitarian relief to Kosovar Albanians. They had 
also made mutual goodwill gestures to indicate their willingness to cooperate on a 
diplomatic level in resolving the crisis. Furthermore, cooperation between the Greek 
Foreign Minister G. Papadreou and his Turkish counterpart Ismail Cem facilitated 
the movement of refugees through northeastern Greece on their way from F.Y.R. 
Macedonia to Turkey. The two ministers communicated regularly and directly to help 
NATO prevail over Slobodan Milosevic. Ten thousands of NATO peacekeepers had 
been deployed in Kosovo through Thessaloniki, while -  following a request by Cem to 
Papandreou-Greece allowed Turkish military transport planes carrying aid to Albania 
and F.Y.R. Macedonia to pass through Greek airspace. Turkey provided F-16s for 
combat operations and opened its air bases for the expanded air campaign against
Serb targets 34
The Kosovo crisis and the war in former Yugoslavia underlined not only the gravity 
of the new reality but also the growing economic and political interdependence in 
the region . Under these circumstances, Greece and Turkey, encouraged also by the 
experience of the fruitful bilateral cooperation established during the Kosovo conflict, 
decided to start an exploratory dialogue. At the June 30 meeting in New 
York, on the sidelines of a U.N conference on Kosovo reconstruction, the two sides 
agreed to hold meetings between senior officials from the respective Foreign 
Ministries on “low politics” issues concerning tourism, culture, the environment, trade 
and commerce, multilateral cooperation, especially in the regions of the Black Sea and 
Southeastern Europe and, finally, organized crime, illegal immigration, drug trafficking
34 Macedonian Press Agency , (16 April 1999)
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and terrorism Two appointed committees comprising only high-level officials of the 
Foreign Ministries have been assigned to explore the feasibility of cooperating in these 
areas and determine the ways and means of enhancing cooperation. Within the 
framework of these committees, which met on a regular basis in order to monitor the 
process, Working Groups on trade and economy, tourism , regional cooperation, culture, 
environment and combating crime, terrorism, illegal immigration and illicit drug 
trafficking, composed of experts, have gathered in order to draft agreements and make 
them ready for signature. Nine bilateral agreements on the above-mentioned areas have 
already been concluded, during the visits by Ministers Papandreou and Cem to the 
respective capitals (see chapter 4 , p. 68). The two committees agreed to create a 
Steering Committee to overlook the development of the process and the continuation
of the Working Groups 35
This newly-born and promising bilateral dialogue on “second class” issues of 
economic and functional nature aims at easing off the tension and the 
improvement of the climate in Greek-Turkish relations. It constitutes an attempt in the 
framework of the neo-ftmctionalism rapprochement that can be proved mutually 
advantageous for both countries, as it proved successftil for the European Community 
in the early fifties. The “high politics” issues, such as the Aegean disputes and the 
Cyprus question do not comprise part of this dialogue. For Greece, matters of 
sovereignty are unnegotiable and she persists in her premise that the two countries 
jointly apply to the International Court of Justice for the delimitation of the 
continental shelf, while for Cyprus she supports the “federal solution” based on the
’^interview with Ercüment Enç (İkili Ekonomik İlişkiler Daire BaşkanıyDirector o f Bilateral Economic 
Relations o f the Ministry o f Foreign Affairs o f the Republic of Turkey), 20 June 2000, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs o f the Republic o f Turkey, Ankara.
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U.N resolutions and the high level agreements of 1977 and 1979 (see Chapter l,p.7). If 
the bilateral climate improves, the two countries might be able to deal with the 
“hard” security issues that have divided them for years.
In addition to the positive evolutions of the sununer of 1999, an atmospheric change 
among the Greeks and the Turks, when both countries became victims of two 
devastating earthquakes in August and September 1999, sparked off a further 
rapprochement. These natural catastrophes created a wave of compassion and 
spontaneous assistance across the borders, and strengthened the spirit of neighborly 
good will in both countries, at least in the minds of the two peoples. The earthquakes 
have done more to improve relations between the two countries than years of 
diplomatic efforts, as popular sympathy for the other country’s victims surfaced at the 
grassroots level in both nations. There was also an unprecedented outpouring of 
affection in each country’s media toward the other country.
The situation had given new momentum to bilateral discussion committees set up by 
the two foreign ministers in June 1999 and to the commitment of the two countries to 
improving relations. A rapid expansion of Greek-Turkish goodwill gestures was taking 
place. The Athens’ Mayor with his Istanbul counterpart exchanged visits in Istanbul 
and Athens respectively and signed a cooperation agreement between the two big 
cities in the sectors of culture, trade and business ties, tourism , and technical support. 
The Turkish section of the Greek-Turkish Business Council decided to resume a 
dialogue with Greek section, which Turkish industrialists broke off in February 1999 
because of the Ocalan crisis. Finally, a series of cultural exchange programs, concerts,
Giannos Kranidiotis “The prospects o f a Greek-Turkish Dialogue” , To V im a,( 11 M y 1999).
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and seminars is still being realized in both countries in order to promote Greek- 
Turkish friendship and cooperation This new quality of the Greek-Turkish 
relationship is being shaped further after the positive position of Greece towards the 
issue of Turkey’s EU candidacy at the Helsinki Summit (December 1999).
2.2. Greek-Turkish Relations in the European Context
The relations between Turkey and the EU have been shaped into the framework of 
the Joint-Agreement or Ankara Agreement which had been signed on September 12, 
1963 in Ankara. This agreement’s chief objective was the gradual accomplishment of 
the Customs Union, while membership status was set up on a long-term basis
The economic relations between the EU and Turkey had to be developed over 3 
phases: a) the preparatory phase of five year duration, during which Turkey with the 
backing of EU had to improve its economy and to reach such a standard of 
efficiency that would enable it to meet the requirements of the subsequent phases, b) 
the transitional phase of 12 to 22 year duration, during which the gradual abolition of 
tariffs was included, and the c) final phase which means the completion of the
Customs Union.39
However,the relations between Turkey and EU did not evolve under normal
Western Policy Center Retnonal report on Greece and Turicev, voL5 , issue 2 ,(  January 2000).
’*Onur Oymen “Türkiye’nin gücü,” Doğan Kitapçılık A Ş , Hürriyet Medya Towers, October I998,p.206.
Panos Kazakos&Pan. Liargovas “H Ellinotourkild Oikonomiki Synergasia”(The Greek-Turkish Economic 
Cooperation,) Papazisis Publications, Athens 1997, p. 114.
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conditions due to the political and economic situation in Turkey ( the militaiy coup in 
1980, the occupation of North Cyprus, the economic crisis in 1977) and the strained 
relations with Greece. Greece, an official member of the EU since 1 January 1981, 
had been vetoing the financial protocols designed for Turkey by reason of Turkish 
armed forces’ stay in North Cyprus and the violation of human rights
On April 14,1987 Turkey, under the leadership of Turgut Ozal, applied for full 
membership. Europe answered in the negative to Turkey’s request in 1989, but 
suggested the completion of the Customs Union. On March 6 , 1995 the Customs 
Union Agreement was decided. This agreement was ratified by the European 
Parliament in December 1995 and put into force on January 1, 1996 The 
Greek side tied up the Customs Union with the Cyprus problem, and lifted its 
objections to Turkey’s entry into a European Customs Union with the understanding 
that the application of Cyprus for EU membership would enter the “ accession talks” 
stage in Brussels, following the completion of the Intergovernmental Conference in
1997.42
The Greek gesture elicited no positive response from Tansu Ciller’s Turkish 
government. A series of incidents between the two states reached a high point in 
January 1996 (see chapter l,p. 15). In July 1996, the EU Council of Ministers issued a 
declaration stating that relations between Turkey and the EU should be guided by 
respect for international law , international agreements, and the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of the EU member states.
40 Ibid. ,p. 116.
^'Mehmet Ali Birand “ Türkiye’nin Avrupa Macerası 1959-1999,” Doğan Kitapçılık AŞ , Hürriyet Medya 
Towers, February 2000 ,p. 32 ,34 .
See Panos Kazakos & Pan. Liargovas, p. 122.
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In April 1997 Greece and Turkey agreed with the proposal of the Dutch presidency 
of the EU to establish a committee of experts to study the bilateral problems. Greece 
pointed out that the exchange of views between the experts was neither a political 
dialogue nor arbitration. It was presumably an exercise to promote detente
In the Luxembourg EU summit meeting of 12-14 December 1997,which laid the 
basis for the EU enlargement process, Turkey failed to make the list of candidates for 
accession due to its poor human rights’ record, its highly strained relations with 
Greece, and its negative position on Cyprus. The EU-Presidency of Luxembourg 
tersely drew the conclusion that “the political and economic conditions on the basis of 
which accession negotiations can be considered were not yet satisfied” (paragraph 31). 
Furthermore, the European Council recalled that strengthening Turkey’s links with the 
EU depended on the country’s pursuit of the political and economic reforms on which 
it had embarked,as well as on a satisfactory and stable relationship between Ankara 
and Athens, and a political solution in Cyprus. Turkey was explicity required to 
contribute “to the settlement of the disputes, in particular by legal process, including 
the International Court of Justice” (paragraph 35)'* .^ With this perspective on the issue, 
the EU followed the Greek position. At that time Turkey responded with 
disappointment and irritation, and the Turkish government even considered breaking 
off, or at least, freezing its relationship with the EU
Almost two years later the European Commission published a new report on the
Thanos Veremis “ Greek-Turkish Problems : An Inter-Alliance Conflict,” p. 1, 2.
‘'^Luxembourg European Council 12 and 13 December 1997Presidency Conclusions. Thesis. vol. 1 , No.4 . 
(winter 1997-98).
See Mehmet Ali Birand , p. 516.
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future relations of the EU with Turkey. This paper, written with reference to the 
Helsinki Sununit, presented a more positive outlook on Turkey acquiring the state of 
a candidate for membership. As far as the Commission is concerned, discussions of 
accession can only start, once the political criteria for the membership are fulfilled. 
The president of the EU Commission, Romano Prodi, appealed that Turkey be 
given the official status of a candidate for membership. That way Turkey would be 
given an incentive to meet the so-called Copenhagen political and economic criteria 
for membership
On December 12, 1999 the EU named Turkey a candidate for membership at its 
Helsinki Summit, making it clear that sweeping political, economic and human rights 
reforms, the resolution of Greek-Turkish disputes , and progress on overcoming the 
division of Cyprus would be necessary before the country becomes the first Muslim 
nation to join the bloc. The move was made possible by Greece’s lifting of its veto 
over Turkey’s candidacy in exchange for wording in the European Council 
conclusions that met three demands of the Greek government; a political 
settlement to reunite Cyprus will not be a precondition for the accession of Nicosia to 
the E U ; outstanding border disputes, such as Greek-Turkish disputes in the Aegean, 
will be referred to the International Court of Justice at the latest by the end of 2004, 
if a negotiated settlement is not reached; and, Turkey’s candidacy will be handled on
the same basis as the candidacies of other nations.47
Athens’ lifting of its veto has not only furthered Greece’s relationship with Turkey,
but it has also strengthened the country’ relationship with Brussels, only a few months
^  See Jürgen Reuter, p. 12.
Ibid. ,p. 14.
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before the Greek government will be applying for admission to Europe’s Economic 
and Monetary Union (EMU) IN January 2001 Steps taken by Turkey that encouraged 
the EU to grant it candidacy status included modest steps to improve its human rights 
record, economic reforms, a scaling-back of its war against PKK since the capture of 
its leader Ocalan (February 1999), and an improvement in relations with Greece, 
especially during the Kosovo conflict and after the earthquakes
The Greek-Turkish tension has been a serious problem and a long-lasting “headache” 
for the E U . A potential war between these two states would be a dramatic failure for 
the E U . Not only would the EU’s Mediterranean policy and its presence in the 
Balkans be affected seriously, but its image and credibility would also suffer a serious 
set-back. For these reasons Greece, a member state of the Union, and Turkey, an 
associated member candidate for accession, should not be left alone in their 
complicated relationship. It would be wrong if the EU were to remain in a passive 
role, to merely judge Turkey’s observance of the Copenhagen criteria. Supportive 
action by the EU will assist Turkey to find its European way. Embedded in this is 
the rapprochement between Greece and Turkey. The official European policy should 
examine the Greek-Turkish mutual interests, the opportunities to advance these 
interests, and the prospects for working together to achieve both countries’ objectives.^®
Moreover, Greece has clearly stated that she welcomed Turkey’s EU orientation and
“** Theodoras Couloumbis & Thanos Veremis “ Greek Foreign Policy in a post-Helsinki setting,” Athens 
News (18 January 2000).
See Mehmet Ali Birand, p. 523.
”  Theodoras Couloumbis & Constantine Lyberopoulos “The troubled triangle; C)rprus, Greece, Turkey,” (June
1999), ihttp:///www.eliamen.ct). p.3.
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supported its path towards Europe, since instead of a threat to Greece, Turkey in 
Europe would be a reassurance. Such an evolution would herald new prospects for the 
bilateral relations and for the future of a once turbulent region
23. Greek-Turkish Cooperation Schemes in a Multilateral Context
The momentous changes following the disintegration of both the Soviet Union and the 
Yugoslav Federation have been under way for a decade now and have transformed 
the broader region in terms of both politics and the economy. A system, built and 
consolidated for more than half a centmy, collapsed and has given way to a 
completely new reality for the states and their peoples, by altering their needs and 
perceptions and re-shaping the relations between them and their immediate neighbors. 
The economic interdependence and the globalization of economies have come to the 
forefront, pushing the political goals of countries .
Meanwhile, Turkey, which belongs to the Mediterranean basin, the Black Sea basin, 
and the Balkan sub-region, and Greece, as the only EU member state of the region, 
are actively encouraging cooperation schemes in order to contribute to the 
establishment of conditions of stability and peace in the wider area. In this context, 
Turkey and Greece played a leading role in setting up the Black Sea Economic 
Cooperation (BSEC) .The idea underlying this regional cooperation scheme was to bring 
into being a large community of Black Sea and Balkan states by means of economic 
joint ventures and increased trade. This is intended to engender peaceful
’’ George Papandreou “ Greek Foreign Policy : A policy o f stability , cooperation and development,” Thesis. 
vol.4 , no .4 ,( winter 1998/99), p.3,4.
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interdependence among them . The BSEC epitomizes a visionary approach to 
strengthening peace in the region by economic confidence-building.^^
The day of 25 June 1992 launched the process known to the world today as the 
Black Sea Economic Cooperation, at the Summit Declaration in Istanbul, and the 
BSEC has become a symbol for a new regional cooperation model. The BSEC is 
comprised of Russia, Turkey, Greece, Ukraine, Georgia, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, 
Moldova, Armenia and Azerbaijan. One of the basic objectives of the BSEC, 
proclaimed in the “Summit Declaration” , is to ensure that the Black Sea becomes a 
sea of peace, stability and prosperity, encouraging friendly and good-neighborly 
relations. The 11 members of BSEC signed a charter at the Yalta Summit, held on 
4-5 June 1998, allowing the group's’elevation to an official international 
organization. On 13 August 1998, the Headquarters Agreement of the Black Sea Trade 
and Development Bank was initialed in Athens by the Greek Deputy Secretary of 
Foreign Affairs and the Turkish President of the Bank. The Bank, which is located in 
Thessaloniki (Greece) and began functioning in 1999, is expected to contribute, through 
financing programs and projects, to the economic development of the BSEC area and
to cultivate further Greek-Turkish cooperation.53
Another recent initiative in Southern Europe,this time,that may have the potential to 
foster Greek-Turkish economic and political ties and to increase the interdependence 
between them , is the Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI). The SECI 
came into being officially at the inaugural meeting held in Geneva in December 1996 
formally adopting the SECI Statement of Purpose. The SECI participants are Albania,
Levent Bilman “The regional cooperation initiatives in Southeast Europe and the Turkish Foreign 
Policy,” Perceptions,( September-November 1998), p.69.
Black Sea Economic cooperation (www.treasury.gov.tr^lacksea.html).
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Greece, Turkey, Hungary, FYROM, Slovenia, Romania and Moldova. SECI intends to 
bring regional decision-makers together to discuss mutual economic and environmental 
concerns through joint projects, meetings and conferences. It closely cooperates with 
the United Nations’ Economic Commission
In 1996, after the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement following the war in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Balkan countries, with Greece and Turkey keeping the 
leading roles, embarked on an effort to lay the basis for cooperation which would 
gradually build a climate of confidence, good neighborliness and stability in the area. 
On 9-10 June 1997,the Southeastern European Conference took place in Thessaloniki 
and the foreign ministers of the Balkan countries discussed the subject how to 
improve political, economic and social cooperation. In the Conference’s official closing 
statement, known as the “Declaration of Thessaloniki” , the Foreign Ministers, besides 
making general remarks about trust-inspiring measures, also promoted the need for a 
rapid liberalization of the Common Market,thus providing the people of the region 
with growing prosperity.
They also decided to inaugurate a center for crisis management in Thessaloniki and to 
hold a Southeast European Summit of heads of the state or government on Crete 
(Greece) at the end of 1997 Indeed, the first summit meeting in the history of the 
countries of S.E Europe was held on the island of Crete on 3-4 November 1997 and 
it was successfully concluded with a mutual declaration of intention of peaceful 
cooperation. The participating countries were able to identify a common goal, which 
was integration with the European and Euro-Atlantic institutions (“incorporation
See Levent Bilman, p.74.
”  Ibid., p 73.
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through cooperation”) . All of them agreed that the summit meeting and the meeting 
of Foreign Ministers must become a regular fixed event. The heads of state and 
government met once again in the autumn 1998 in Antalya (Turkey)
In these and other ways, Greece and Tiukey demonstrated their willingness to work 
together, help each other, and advance mutual interests in ways that shatter 
conventional thinking about their relationship. Greeks and Turks must become 
accustomed to the notion that they can co-exist in a non-zero-sum world. The future 
of their relationship lies in the recognition that interdependence and globalization are 
overtaking the rest of the world. In that fiamework, multilateral organizations such as 
NATO and the EU can help the two states to move along a more productive path, as 
they recognize that their own geopolitical interests are served by strengthening ties on 
many levels
56 Greek Ministry o f Press and Mass Media “ Regional Cooperation in Southeastern Europe” 
(www.minpress.gr) ,  p.l5.
”  See Theodores Couloumbis & Con. Lymberopoulos, p.9.
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CHAPTER HI
THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PROFILE OF GREECE AND
TURKEY
3.1. GREECE
Greece is a country that is at once European, Balkan, and Mediterranean, as it lies at 
the juncture of Europe, Asia, and Africa. Greece has an area of 131,957 square 
kilometres, of which one fifth constitutes the Greek islands, while two thirds of the 
country is classified as hilly and mountainous. It is a land of mountains and of sea, a 
small country of 10 million people that shares borders to the north with Albania,ex- 
Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and to the east with Turkey.
The country’s capital is Athens, which has expanded rapidly in the period since 
World War I I . The area around the capital (Attica) is now home to about one third of 
the country’s entire population. The Greeks, like the Jews and the Armenians, are 
people of the diaspora. More than 4 million Greeks are estimated to live abroad, 
including over 2 million in America
Of all citizens of the Hellenic Republic 97.6% are Greek Orthodox Christians, 1.3% 
Muslims, 0.4% Roman Catholics, 0.7% other, including Jews.
58 Encyclopaedia Britannica “Greece” (www.britannica.com)
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From ancient Greece the modem country inherited a sophisticated culture, which 
constitutes the foundation of the Western civilization, and a language that has been 
documented for almost three millennia and has contributed much to all western 
languages
Greece is the birthplace of politics as an art and democracy as a form of government. 
The present Greek Constitution, voted in 1975 and amended in 1986, defines the 
country’s political system as a Parliamentary Democracy headed by a President. 
Legislative powers are exercised by a single Chamber Parliament (the Vouli ton 
Ellinon), members of which are elected by direct popular vote to serve four year 
terms. Executive powers are vested in the Government. The President of the Republic 
is elected by the parliament for a five year term, renewable only once. Mr. Costis 
Stefanopoulos is the President of the Hellenic Republic (since March 1995). The 
Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) currently forms the government, following 
its victory in the April 2000 election. Mr. Costas Simitis is the Greek Prime Minister 
(since 19 January 1996).
Greece is a modem European state with a forward-looking democracy and a dynamic 
market economy. She is a member of NATO, of the European Union, which she 
joined in 1981 ,and of many other Western organizations which are responsible for 
peace, stability, security and economic prosperity in Europe and the rest of the world. 
In the post-Cold War era Greece sought to play a leading role in promoting 
cooperation in South-Eastern Europe, as the sole member of the EU in the area
’’ “Athens” (www.balcantrade.org/countrv/greece). p. 1-2. 
Brief on Greece (www.mfa.gr/aboutgr/),p,6.
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ЭЛЛ. The Political Evolution
Greece has a history stretching back almost 4000 years. It is heir to the heritages of 
classical Greece and the Byzantine Empire. The Byzantine Empire fell to the Turks in 
1453 and the Greeks remained under the Ottoman rule for nearly 400 years, until the 
Greek War of Independence (-1821-1830). A large part of present day Greece was not 
freed until the Balkan Wars (1912-13).
For Greece, the twentieth century was a period full of violence and uncertainty 
The last years of the century, however, have brought the potential for political 
stability and economic prosperity as a part of a European continent undergoing 
unprecedented unification. Democracy, the theoretical basis of governance since the 
foundation of the modem Greek state in 1832,has had its longest and most consistent 
application in the era that began with the toppling of the military junta in 1974. 
Economic growth was aided by substantial infrastmctural aid programs and strict 
economic guidelines from Greece’s partner nations in the EU.^'
Greece was directly involved in the two World Wars, suffering devastating damage 
from the Nazi occupation of 1941-44. The political schism that had begim in the 
early 1900s between royalists and republicans then fueled a disastrous civil war 
immediately following World War II The three-year Civil War ended with the victory 
of conservative factions over the left side of the political spectrum and left the 
country with a stunted parliamentary system characterized by a meddling monarch, 
pervasive domestic surveillance tactics, and interventionist foreign allies throughout the
Vyron Theodoropoulos “The foreign policy of Greece” , Sideris Publications, Athens 1996, p.35.
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1950s and early 1960s. These major deficiencies of the post-World War II political 
atmosphere made the accession of a military dictatorship possible in 1967
After seven years of militaiy regime and of political isolation ended in 1974, the 
government of Konstantinos Karamanlis’s party, New Democracy (N.D) sought to 
resolve the difficult questions that inhibited the political stability and evolution of the 
country, by legalizing the communist party (illegal since the end of the Civil War 
1949) and by establishing a presidential republic(monarchy rejected by referendum on 
December 1974). Prime Minister Karamanlis cleared the way for consolidation of 
the new democratic gains and the expanded political spectrum led to vigorous calls 
for further democratization and modernization. In that ftamework, Karamanlis as the 
leader who initiated Greece’s associate membership with the EU in 1961, again in 
1974 steered Greece into the EU ties that the junta had relinquished in 1969 In his 
view, close association with the economic organizations of the democratic West would 
institutionalize democracy and make a militaiy coup less likely, while at the same 
time would relieve the pressures stemming from Greece’s dependency on a single 
foreign power (the United States) in the bipolar world of the Cold War.^^
In 1981 Greece enjoyed full EU membership and in the same year Andreas 
Papandreou’s Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), a leftist ideology party, came 
to power. In the 19 years that followed, PASOK and the main conservative party, 
N.D., gained alternating majorities in the unicameral legislative Assembly (N.D. last 
came to power between 1989-1993, while PASOK has governed the country 16 years 
out of the past 19). Although the two parties started the 1980s with drastically 
opposed positions on issues of national security and domestic economics, both
62 <‘Greece : Government and Politics” , (www.blacksea/cstdy) ,p.2.
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positions have moved toward the center in many respects. One reason of this lack of 
significant policy differences is that the Greek policy-makers, whether drawn from the 
ranks of N.D. or PASOK, in their efforts to secure full European integration, have 
avoided the dilemma between a Europeanist and an Atlanticist profile. They have 
opted instead for a Euro-Atlanticist stance recognizing that there is adequate coherence 
in a strategy which pursues political and economic integration through the European 
Union and, at the same time, relies mainly on NATO for the provision of collective 
defense and collective security values
By signing the Single European Act in 1985, the PASOK government committed 
Greece to a broad set of social, environmental, and technological goals set by the EU 
with the expectation that a single European market could be established in 1992 In 
the event,the Maastricht Treaty of 1992,which upon its ratification in 1993 
established the EU as the basis of the single market, found overwhelming political 
support from Greece. The country’s commitment to the European Union constitutes the 
basis for a consensus between the government and the opposition parties, a consensus 
that implies political stability, so vital for Greece to reach one of the most ambitious 
goals in the history of Europe; the entering into European Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU) at the start of 2001 ^  In short, the prognosis for Greece’s Western 
profile is solid for the foreseeable future,given that the Greek socialists have 
unequivocally adopted a pro-EU and pro-NATO policy,while the conservative 
opposition’s stance has been and continues to be fervent pro-Western.
63 Theodoras Couloumbis “Strategic Consensus in Greek Domestic and Foreign Policy since 1974” in 
THESIS ■ vol.l, no .4 , (winter 1997-98), p. 11.
^  Tassos Giannitsis “ Greece and the European and Monetary Union” in THESIS vol 1 no 1 ( spring 
1997),p. 15.
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3.1.2. The Economy
3.I.2.I. Economic Developments
In the last half of the twentieth century, the transition of the Greek economy to 
higher levels of growth did not follow a course of even and regular development j in 
fact, the Greek economy passed through successive stages of reconstruction, 
preparation for development, weakening, and recession until it made substantial 
progress on vital economic fronts and created a healthy economic climate.
Greece is a small country with a territory dominated by large mountain ranges and an 
extensive coastline. This land offers the natural resources on which the traditional 
economic activities of agriculture, herding and fishing were based . Despite periodic 
modernization programs of industrialization that began in the late nineteenth centuiy, 
Greece remained mainly an agricultural country until the middle of the twentieth 
century. Although Greece emerged from the calamitous 1940s shattered politically and 
economically, in the post-World War II e ra , the Greek economy underwent significant 
transformation due to significant amounts of United States aid (Truman Doctrine, 1947,
Marshall Plan, 1949).65
The period from the late 1950s to the late 1960s has been characterized as the era of 
the “Greek economic miracle”. During this period the gross domestic product (GDP) 
grew at the fastest rate in Western Europe (7.6% aimually), while the industrial sector 
became an important part of the national economy, which was bolstered by a number
65 Konstantinos Drakatos“0  Mégalos Kuklos tis EUinikis Oikonomias 1945-1995”(The Big Circle o f the 
Greek Economy 1945-1995,) Papazisis Publications, Athens, 1997, p.l 1.
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of large foreign investment projects. The most significant elements of this growth 
were the shipping, pharmaceutics, metallurgy, and electrical machinery industries.
Economic growth, industrialization, and urbanization associated with the inequitable 
distribution of new wealth caused social tensions in the 1960s,and by the early 1970s 
a major economic crisis developed The crisis, caused by inept domestic economic 
policies, excessive borrowing in the public sector, budget deficits , inflation, and 
international energy crises(1973),brought the “Greek economic miracle to an end” . 
The end of the period of growth became obvious after the reestablishment of 
democracy in Greece, in 1974. The democratic governments of the 1970s and 1980s 
faced the accumulated internal problems of economic institutions and the social 
modernization that had been neglected by the junta
Greece’s return to its association with the EU after ties had been severed during the 
dictatorship, was a major institutional event in the restoration of democracy and 
economy. Upon achieving full membership in 1981, Greece began an enormous 
reorganization of its economic structures, a gradual adjustment of its legislation and 
elimination of its protectionist policies, leading eventually to full liberalization of trade 
and the movement of capital and labor. The extended liberalization of the product and 
capital markets had fundamental effects on the productive structure of the country. 
Especially the industrial sector and certain important parts of the services sector went 
through significant changes. Within a few years, they moved from a state of marked 
protectionism to a phase of intense international competition. These efforts for the 
improvement and extension of economic and social infrastructures have been greatly 
boosted by the Second Community Support Framework (Delors Package Number Two),
66 Ibid . p.58.
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a program adopted by the EU in to distribute its structural funds among member 
nations whose per capita income was below 75% of the community’s average. At the 
beginning of the program .Greece was one of these nations . Under this package, 
between 1994 and 1999,Greece received US$30 billion for inifastructural investments, 
training programs , agricultural support, and other initiatives . The resources from the 
Community Support Program in conjunction with public and private investment activity 
led to accelerating growth rates in investments, to the stabilization of the 
unemployment rate at levels below 10%, and to the decrease of annual inflation 
below the 10% (1994-96)
For Greece, one of the greatest challenges of the 1990s was to meet the convergence 
criteria ( set by the Maastricht treaty of 1992) for joining the European Monetary 
Union (EMU). The Greece of 2000 is coming close to fulfilling the criteria necessary 
for the participation of the Greek economy in the last stage of EMU by January 
2001 . On 14 March 1998 the EU’s monetary committee accepted the Greek coin 
(drachma) into the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM). Entry to the ERM 
was made possible by the considerable economic reforms and successes during the 
three first years of the Greek government’s “convergence programme 1994-1999.” *^ 
Greece is oriented towards EMU for the same reasons that motivate most of the 
member states: higher growth potential, achievement of a greater economic stability, 
and maintenance of a broader cooperation .
Today, the Greek economy can be generally described as a “market oriented
67,See Tassos Giannitsis, p. 17.
“Greece and the Economic and Monetary Union of the ELT’ in Greece in the W orld. edited by the 
Greek Ministry o f Press and Mass M edia, Athens, 1999 , p. 18.
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economy” with limited state intervention. Both internal market and external economic 
relations are fully liberalized as in every internationally integrated economy
3.I.2.2. The Economic Structure
TABLE 1
GREECE 1998-1999
ECONOMIC AND DEMOGRAPHIC IDENTITY
Gross National Product(GNP)/per capita 11.926
GNP in billion $ 1998 556
Population 10.521,7
■ ----------------- - -----------------
Rise of population (%) 0,4
Gross Investments of Fixed Capital (%) 8,6
Imports (in million $) 18.995
Exports (in million $) 6.252
Trade Balance -12.742
GDP growth (%) 3,7
Unemplovment rate (%) (EU-harmonized unemployment rate) 9,2
Unit Labor Cost (%) 1,5
Inflation rate(%) 3,6
Source: Nadona! Statistical Service o f Greece 1999
Greece’s competitive advantages have traditionally been in agriculture, shipping and 
tourism. Presently, the services sector accounts for 61% of GDP indicating the 
development of trade and banking, finance and consulting services in Greece.
Agriculture accounts for 22% of total employment and its gross added value is about 
14.2% of the value of end products. Agriculture, forestry and fishing make up about 
11.7% of the GDP . The climatic conditions of Greece favor fniits, vegetables, tobacco.
"’ “Greek Economy in the 21th renm iy” in HERMES SPECIAL EDITION2000. no. 41, edited by M. 
Moragjanis & E. W ebster, p.94.
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cotton, vines, olives, and extensive rearing of sheep and goats. Fishing represents a 
major source of income, especially in the Aegean and the Ionian islands, where it 
employs 30% to 40% of the population, and 0.33% of Greece’s GDP
Manufacture also, is a significant sector of the Greek economy. Its structure is 
characterized by small enterprises with less than 20 employees, which represent 58% 
of total industrial employment. The gross added value of industrial production 
represents 30% of the value of the end programs and mining, quarrying and 
manufacturing make up about 18.3% of the GDP. The most important industrial 
sectors are : food and beverages, textiles and clothing, electrical appliances, chemicals 
and furniture. Mining represents an important sector with a constant growth as far as 
lignite, iron ores, bauxite, mixed sulphurous ores and barytes are concerned. Such 
mining products account for 3% of Greece’s total export activity. Greek industry is 
specialized in highly labor-intensive sectors and it accounts for more than 20% of 
total value in three geographical regions: mainland Greece 31% ,central Macedonia
23% and Attica 21%. 71
In Greece, the services’ sector share of GDP has increased from 56.38% in 1988 to 
61% in 1998. The most important fields of the services sector are tourism, shipping, 
banking and trade.
The country’s natural and cultural attractions make the tourist industry an important 
component of the Greek economy, accounting for 11% of GDP and 11% of total
™ “Greece : Your Strategic Partner in the New Millenium,” edited by the Greek Ministry of Press and 
Mass M edia, Secretariat General o f Information, Athens ,1999, p.21.
71 FORUM (July/August 1999)
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employment, while hotels represent 6.5% of the total net fixed capital. Foreign 
currency inflows totaling US$ 3,723 million in 1997 makes tourism the most 
important foreign currency earner for the country
Greece’s long seafaring tradition makes shipping also an important sector of the Greek 
economy and an important currency earner for the country, since foreign currency 
inflow through shipping reached US$ 2,263 million in 1996. The contribution of the 
shipping sector to GDP is 7% and its linkages with the Greek economy are reflected 
in ; a) the large percentage of the Greek-owned fleet that is registered with the 
national shipping register; the Greek-owned merchant fleet consisted of 1,927 vessels 
in 1997, while the Greek passenger fleet, which consisted of 356 vessels in 1999, 
represent an important link between the continental part of Greece and the islands, as 
well as between Greece and the coimtries of European Union, Middle East and the 
Black Sea; b) the employment of a large number of Greek seamen; during 1995 , 
24,190 Greek and 9,183 foreign seamen were employed on Greek-owned vessels ;c) 
the large number of shipping companies established in Greece, and especially in
Piraeus , the country’s largest port.73
Banking is another sector of growing importance for the Greek economy and it 
accounts for 3,55% of the GDP. The Greek banking system has been fully liberalized, 
with no controls on the flow of ftmds in or out of the country and on foreign 
exchange, in order to meet EU financial integration standards ( the introduction of 
the EURO), as well as internationally acceptable standards. Deregulation of Greece’s 
banking sector in the mid 1990s eased the supply of capital, fostered new
^ “The Profile o f the BSEC Countries : Greece” NAFTEMPORIKl. Special edition (11 July 1999) 
’^Ibid.
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opportunities in the provision of banking products and services, and marked the 
establishment of many privately-owned and foreign banks. Furthermore, the Bank of 
Greece has been granted complete independence from the government in exercising 
and implementing the country’s monetary policy. There are over 50 banks and bank- 
type institutions operating in Greece. About 20 of them are subsidiaries or branches of 
foreign banks, more than 10 are privately-owned, and the rest are state-controlled. 
Three state-controlled banks command about 70% of the market, with one of them, 
the National Bank of Greece, having a 40% of the market share 7'*
Last, but not least, in the catalogue of the dynamic sectors of the Greek economy is 
trade. Its contribution to GDP is about 12,7% with a rising trend. Trade represents a 
long-lasting tradition for the Greek people and accoimts for 13% of total employment. 
The Greek landscape, which comprises many mountains, several insular regions,and 
many islands, gave rise to the formation of a large number of small commercial 
enterprises. Despite the trend towards the formation of large chain stores, numerous 
small and medium-size trade companies still operate in the market. There are about 
369,148 outlets,of which around 86% are retail outlets and the remaining 14% are 
wholesale outlets.
A great deal of the Greek economy depends also on foreign trade,both importing 
and exporting. The industrial sectors with very good export performance are food and 
beverages, tobacco, textiles, clothing and footwear, basic industries of metal products, 
plastic products and furniture. With regard to imports,the major imported products are 
manufactured consumer goods, capital goods, food, crude o il, chemicals, iron and
“Special edition for the Greek Economy: The Banking System” QIKONOMIKQS TAHYDROMOS (30 
September 1999).
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steel.
Although the European Union remains the country’s main international trade partner, 
recently,the potential of Greece to export its products to the Balkans and other 
Eastern European countries with emerging economies, has increased. Greece’s share of 
exports to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe as well as to Asia rose from 
17% in 1992 to 30% in 1996 . In particular, in Balkan states,like Bulgaria, Romania, 
FYROM, Albania, Greece is among the most important trade partners in terms of 
companies and investments
TABLE 2
Origins of gross domestic product 1998 % of total
Agriculture, forestry & fishing 8,3
M ining, quarrying & manufacturing 19,2
Electricity, gas & water 2,1
Construction _______________ _ ________ 8 J__________
Trade & financial services 19.1
Transport & communications _________________________M _________
GDP at m arket prices incl. Others 100.0
TABLE 3
Components o f gross domestic product 1998 % of total
Private consumption 71,8
Government consumption 14,6
Fixed investment 21,5
Change in stocks & statistical discrepancy 0.3
Exports o f goods & services 16,4
Imports o f goods & services -24,6
GDP at m arket prices 100.0
75 See “G reece: Your Strategic Partner in the New Milleniuin,” p. 35.
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TABLE 4
Principal exports 1997 Principal im ports 1997 $m.
Manufactures 2,892 Manufactured consumer goods 9,391
Food & beverages 1,033 Capital goods 5,643
Petroleum products 601 Food 3,138
Raw materials & semi-finished goods 259 Crude oil 2,128
Minerals 229 Chemicals 1,021
Tobacco 181 Iron& steel 704
TABLE 5
M ain destinations o f  exports 1997 % o f  total M ain origins o f  imports 1997 % o f  total
Germany 25,2 Italy 15,6
u s 15,8 Germany 15,5
Italy 10,8 u s 11,1
UK 7,7 France 8,3
EU 56,5 EU 60,9
Central & East European countries ________2 ^ Central & East European countries ___________2 J _
Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1999 ( EIU Country Report 3^ quarter 1999 )
3.2. Turkey
Turkey, officially the Republic of Turkey, is a country situated at the junction of 
Europe and Asia The location on two continents has been a central feature of 
Turkish history, culture and politics. Turkey is among the larger countries of the 
Middle East in terms of territory and population; its land area of 779,452 square 
kilometres is greater than that of any European state and its population, according to 
the 1997 census is approximately 64 million,with an armual average growth rate of 
2.3% in the last decade.
The country shares borders with Greece and Bulgaria to the northwest, with Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Iran to the east, Iraq and Syria to the soirth. Turkey is
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Mediterranean Sea and the Aegean Sea. Of a total boundary length of some 4,000 
miles, about three-fourths is maritime, including coastlines along the Black Sea, the 
Aegean, and the Mediterranean, as well as the narrows that link the Black and 
Aegean seas, a waterway known as the Turkish Straits. Most of the islands along the 
Aegean coast are Greek; only the islands of Gokce and Bozca remain in Turkish
hands.76
The country’s topography is highly varied and differs widely among the seven 
geographical regions, the Marmara region, the Black Sea region, the Mediterranean 
region, the Eastern Anatolian region, the South-East Anatolian region, the Aegean 
region and the Central Anatolian region, each possesing unique climatic and 
ecological features.
Ankara is the nation’s capital with a population of 3,4 million, while Istanbul, the 
commercial and industrial center, has a population of 7,4 million. Once 
overwhelmingly rural, the country is on its way towards rapid urbanization with an 
annual rate of 4.67%. The western parts and coastal areas of the coimtry are the most 
densely populated regions. Approximately 98% of the population is Moslem whereas 
the remaining 2% consists of the followers of Jewish, Orthodox, Protestant and 
Catholic faiths. The official national language is Turkish ^
Turkey is a unitary parliamentary republic. The unicameral legislature, known as the 
Grand National Assembly (Meclis), has 550 members directly elected for up to five- 
year terms. The President of the Republic is elected as the head of the state by
Encyclopaedia Britannica : Turkey, (www.britannica.com).
^ “TURKEY: Investors’ Guide,” published by the Turkish Undersecretariat o f Treasury, Ankara 1999, 
p .5 ,6 .
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members of the Parliament for a seven-year term . Currently the President of the 
Turkish Republic is Ahmet Necdet Sezer (elected in May 2000). The main political 
power is exercised by the Prime Minister, currently Mr. Bulent Ecevit, and the 
Cabinet. The country has been governed for the last ten years by broadly based 
coalitions. The first three articles of Turkey’s present Constitution, which declare 
Turkey to be a democratic and secular republic, cannot be amended.
Turkey is a member of most of the major international organizations, such as NATO, 
World Bank, United Nations, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), and the Islamic Conference Organization. Turkey has had an 
association agreement with the EU since 1963, which foresees full Turkish 
membership of the E U . Since January 1, 1996 Turkey has been a member of the 
Customs Union, while in December 1999,she was nominated as a candidate for full
membership status.78
3.2.1 The Political Profile
A long succession of political entities existed in Asia Minor over the centuries. 
Turkmen tribes invaded Anatolia in the 11* century AD, founding the Seljuq empire; 
during the 14* century the Ottoman Empire began a long expansion, reaching its peak 
during the 17* century. The modem Turkish republic was established in 1923,after 
the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, under the firm control and leadership of Mustafa 
Kemal Atatürk. The new Republic sought western industrialization and the
78 Ibid , p.8.
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establishment of a secular political system by deliberately rejecting important elements 
of Turkey’s Ottoman past, especially the Ottoman claim to spiritual leadership of 
Muslims worldwide.
Atatürk ruled the country for fifteen years,from 1923 until his death in 1938,as a 
charismatic leader and teacher by training and forcing the government, his political 
party (Republican People’s Party/Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi -  CHP), the bureaucracy, the 
military, and the masses to behave in the manner he thought appropriate. Ataturk’s 
“Six Arrows”- secularism, republicanism, etatism, populism , nationalism , and reformism- 
were incorporated into the constitutions of 1924,1961 , and 1982 . Although Ataturkism 
generally has been accepted by the Turkish political elite, it has been contested by 
various organized groups. Turkey has experienced several popular movements of 
Islamic political activism that have challenged the coimtry’s commitment to 
Secularism 7’
Though Atatürk believed that the secularist campaign made a period of authoritarian 
government necessary, his successors sought to establish a democratic government with 
the creation of a multiparty political system. Nevertheless, such a move did not 
restrict the role of the military, which has always had an exceptional place in 
country’s political matters. By the end of the 1950s, the armed forces had assumed a 
role as guardians, not only of national security, but also of Ataturk’s legacy. On three 
occasions, in 1960,1971, and 1980, the senior military intervened to safeguard 
Turkey’s political development from forces that the military believed threatened the 
integrity of the state. In each case, civilian leaders had proved unable or unwilling to 
deliver policies acceptable to the military and in 1960 and 1980, a military junta took
79 Ç,See Pan. Kazakos/Pan. Liargovas, p.l8.
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over the government.
During the second half of the 1970s, the country’s economy, which had undergone 
rapid growth in the p)ost-World War II decades, entered a severe depression. By the 
late 1970s, at least one-quarter of the work force was unemployed, the annual 
inflation rate exceeded 100% and political life became increasingly tense, as 
opposing social and cultural forces found political expression in radical parties and 
organizations . These organizations, which contested Atatürk’s political legacy, included 
leftists active in the Turkish Communist Party (TCP), Islamicly motivated political 
elements behind Necmettin Erbakan’s National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi- 
MSP), and extreme nationalist groups linked to Alparslan Turkes’s Nationalist Action 
Party (Milli Hareket Partisi- МНР). Following the September 1980 coup, the military 
made the restoration of political stability its main priority. The commanders of the 
armed forces formed the National Security Council (NSC), which under the leadership 
of General Kenan Evren, ruled the country until November 1983
A parliamentary election held in November 1983, under the strict supervision of NSC, 
and Turgut Ozal’s Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi-ANAP) achieved a strong 
majority. In power from November 1983 to November 1989, Ozal sought to repair 
Turkey’s “wounded” economy and international reputation, since Western criticisms of 
Turkey’s undemocratic governments and human rights abuses were very painful. His 
package of economic reforms aimed to make Turkey economically similar to the 
countries of EU , a body that Ozal hoped Turkey could join (see Chapter 2 , p.
25-26). His unexpected death in April 1993,opened the doors of the presidential
“ Ibid ,p.20.
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residence to Suleyman Demirel, the head of the True Path Party ( Dogru Yol Partisi- 
DYP) and Turkey’s prime minister at that time (October 1991 elections). Demirel 
remained in the presidential chair until May 2000
3.2.2. The Economic Profile
3.2.2.I. Economic Developments
To a large extent, the last 200 years in Turkey have been marked by its rulers’ 
attempts to transform it into a modem European industrial nation. The Ottoman 
Empire’s Tanzimat (reorganization) reforms of 1839-78,an important component of 
which was the reorientation of the economy toward development of an industrial base, 
led to deepening indebtedness to Western imperial powers by the end of the 
nineteenth century. This dependence on the West created the context for the economic 
policy of the new republic formed in 1923. From the 1930s until 1980, the state 
pursued import-substitution industrialization by means of public enterprises and 
development planning. This policy created a mixed economy in which industrial 
development was rapid
During the post-World War II period, Turkey had pursued an inward-oriented 
development strategy, combined with extensive involvement by the public sector. 
Judged on the basis of the growth rate of industrial production and overall output,the 
performance of postwar decades, especially during the period 1963-77, was
*' “Turkey ; Introduction” (http;///lcweb2.1oc.gov/cstdy) p. 5. 
Ibid., p.8
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impressive. The average growth rate of Gross National Product (GNP) was recorded as 
7%, \sdiile the average growth rate of industrial production was 9%. Several factors, 
such as the rapid increase of Turkish exports during the early 1970s, significant 
inflows of workers’ remittances and short-term inflows from the Euro-currency market, 
exercised a favorable influence on maintaining high rates of economic growth. 
However, during the same period, the drawbacks of excessive state intervention 
became ever more apparent to policy makers and the public. State enterprises that 
came to account for about 40% of manufacturing by 1980 were often overstaffed and 
inefficient; their losses were a significant drain on the government budget. State 
planning targets were often excessively ambitious, yet they neglected such essential 
sectors as agriculture. In addition, the Turkish economy became excessively dependent 
on imports of intermediate and capital goods and unable to increase export earnings to 
finance the necessary import b ill. By the late 1970s the Turkish economy entered a 
severe crisis, a crisis that was to be exacerbated by the deterioration of world
83economic conditions that followed the 1973-74 oil shock.
By the end of 1979,the inward-looking, etatist approach had been discredited as a 
viable option and the administration was converted to the view that a major shift in 
policy was necessary. In January 1980, the new Economic Stabilization Program was 
announced. The main objectives of the program were a reduction in government 
involvement in production activities, an increased emphasis on market forces, the 
replacement of an inward-looking strategy with an export oriented strategy of import 
substitution and the attraction of foreign investment. The results of the economic 
liberalization had been dramatic and Turkey’s economic performance after 1983 was
“TURKISH ECONOMY,” published by the Directorate General o f Economic Research and 
Assessment o f the Turkish Undersecretariat o f Treasury , Ankara, March 1992, p. 4 , 5 .
53
impressive. Real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) averaged an annual 5,5% growth rate 
and actually reached 8% in 1986, higher than that of any other member of OECD. 
The rate of inflation decelerated from almost 110% to 30% during the 1986-89 
period. Until the first years of 1990s Turkey continued to have a good economic 
performance, with an export growth rate exceeding 10% and an external current 
account deficit 2,4% of GNP. On the negative side, during this transition period, 
the Turkish economy faced problems like high inflation, high public debt and high 
interest rates stemming from structural inadequacies, such as unemployment
The Turkish economy continued being transformed in the 1990s from a state-led to a 
market-oriented economy. Inflation is Turkey’s most important economic problem, with 
the increase in both retail and wholesale prices. Nevertheless, lately, the inflation 
is following a decreasing trend with a rate of 63% as of May 1999 in comparison 
with that of May 1998, which was 91%. However, external economic “shocks” and 
subsequent global crises (The Persian Gulf War 1991, the Russian Crisis 1997, 
extraordinary jumps in the oil price 1997-98) negatively affected the Turkish economy, 
while Turkey had to live through the dire consequences of two consecutive earthquakes 
(1999) which struck the nine most developed provinces. It was mainly for these
reasons that the Turkish economy entered into recession 85
As recently as 1999, the Turkish government embarked on a three-year structural 
adjustment and stabilization program, which focused on freeing the country from the 
high rate of inflation, enhancing the prospects for growth and improving living
“Recent Developments in Turkish Economy,” edited by the Central Bank o f the Republic o f Turkey, 
June 1995,p. 10.
“Investment Opportunities and Projects in Turkey,” edited by the Turkish Undersecretariat o f treasury, 
Ankara ,February 2000, p. 2.
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standards across all of Turkish society. In that framework, the agreement signed with 
the IMF in July 1998 (Staff Monitored Program) committed the government to restore 
public finances over the next 18 months and bring inflation down to 20% . On 9 
December 1999, Turkey submitted its letter of intent to the IMF leading to the 
signing of a three-year stand-by agreement with the IMF in line with the economic 
program pursued by the government. The IMF announced the granting of 4 billion $ 
to Turkey in order to support the government’s economic program for the period 
2000-2002 Today, the World Bank has identified Turkey as one of the ten most 
promising emerging economies, and , in fact, Turkey’s national income of 410 billion $ 
already makes it the world’s lb*** largest economy (Turkey was included in the 
recently established G-20 Group).
The Turkish economy’s ongoing and turbulent reorientation has left the economy a 
study of contrasts. Modem industries coexist with pockets of subsistence agriculture. 
The major cities of western Anatolia are cosmopolitan centers of industry, finance, 
and trade, whereas the eastern part is relatively underdeveloped. Several decades of 
state planning followed by economic liberalization have made industry Turkey’s 
leading economic sector although a significant percentage of the population continue 
to work on farms. Industry has undergone a fairly rapid transformation due to the far- 
reaching market reforms implemented in the 1980s and early 1990s. However, public 
enterprises continue to dominate raw-materials processing and the manufacture of 
heavy industrial and military goods. The smaller firms that dominate the private sector 
produce intermediate and consumer goods for domestic and foreign markets . The 
services sector is the most diverse, embracing large export-oriented marketing groups
86 Ibid, p. 3.
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and world-scale banks as well as shops and individual domestic workers.87
3.2.2.2 The Economic Structure
TABLE 6
TURKEY
ECONOMIC AND DEMOGRAPfflC IDENTITY 1998-1999
Gross National Product (GNP) / per capita (US$) 3.224(current prices)
GNP (Total) (US$) 204,6 Billion $
Population 63,7 million
Rise of DODulation (%) 1,58
Gross Investments - Growth Rate (%) 16
Imports (in billion $ - 1998) 45,9
Exports (in billion $ - 1998) 26,9
Trade Balance (in billion $) -19,0
GDP growth (%) 2,8
Inflation rate (%) (March 1999) 61,7
Unemployment rate(%) 5,1
External debt (in billion $) 100,98
Source: Turkish Association o f M edium-sized Companies (  MVSIAD )  1999
Since the second World War the Turkish economy has been transformed by the 
steady growth of industry and services and the consequent decline in the share of 
agriculture in national income. Although the growth rate of the Turkish economy has 
been one of the highest in the OECD zone,the growth has also been marked by 
periods of expansion and recession. From 1980s onwards, Turkey has moved in the 
direction of development turned more toward the outside world and international 
competition. Since 1995-96 , the Turkish economy has shown undeniable dynamism .
87 See NAFTEMPORIKI A 11 July 1999).
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The GNP growth rate for 1997 was 8% , while the average of the 15 member states 
of the EU for 1997 was 2.6% . During the first half of 1998, GNP growth remained 
very high(9%) and then slowed considerably in the second half(4% ). In 1998,the 
share of services in GDP was 62.3% ,the share of industry was 21.9% and agriculture 
15.8% .Inflation, on the other hand, having reached 120% in mid-1995 , fell rapidly 
following the stabilization measures adopted in 1994, to reach 80% at the beginning of 
1996, rising to 99% in 1997,101% in January 1998, and falling to 80% in 1999.**
Over the last fifteen years, the Turkish economy has opened up to international 
competition with the abolition of barriers to foreign trade and encouragement of 
foreign investment and multinational companies. Today, Turkey is fully integrated with 
the global economy in trade and finance. An important milestone was the Customs 
Union with the EU that began on January 1, 1996. The EU is the main trading 
partner of Turkey with 55% of total exports and 50% of imports. Among all 15 EU 
member states Germany takes the biggest share both in exports and imports (20.3% 
share). Turkey’s second largest export market was the USA with a share of 8.3% in 
1998. Turkey’s other main trading partners are the Islamic countries, Eastern Europe
89and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).
In 1998, Turkish exports reached $ US 26,8 billion, recording an increase of 2.4% 
over 1997. Imports on the other hand recorded an annual decrease of 5.4% and 
amounted to $ US 45,9 billion. For the period 1998-99, major exports were raw 
materials, especially iron and steel, and consumer durables, whereas major imports 
were building materials, heating and cooling equipment. Grouped according to the main
** “Turkey’s bet” in COOPERATION (monthly Greek magazine), edited by D&G. Kalofolias-Ekdotiki L td ., 
vol .1, (March 2000), p.lO.
“The Turkish Economy and Foreign Trade”(http://www.balcantrade.org/turkey) , p.3.
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sectors, in exports, the share of industrial products is 88.5% , while the share of 
agricultural products is 10.1% and the share of mining products is 1.4%. In imports, 
industrial products occupies the largest share at 86.9% , while the share of agriculture 
is 4.7% With the objectives of increasing export-oriented investment and production 
in Turkey, accelerating the entry of foreign capital and technology, and increasing the 
utilization of external finance and trade possibilities, the Free Trade Zones Law no. 
3218 was put into effect in 1985. Turkish Free Trade Zones offer attractive economic 
incentives to domestic as well as foreign individuals and companies, who can benefit 
from such activities as manufacturing, storing, packing, general trading and banking. 
Economic incentives offered by the free zones are comprised of 100% repatriation of 
capital, 100% tax exemption of any kind of taxation, including corporate and income 
taxes, for an unlimited period of tim e. At present, commercial activities are being 
performed in Mersin, Antalya, Istanbul-Ataturk Airport, Ege and Trabzon Free Zones 
and Istanbul International Stock Exchange Free Zone
Besides trade, another main economic sector of Turkey is the agriculture. Historically, 
the agricultural sector has been Turkey’s largest employer and a major contributor to 
the country’s GDP, exports and industrial growth. Although today agriculture has 
declined in importance relative to the rapidly growing industry and services sector and 
the share of the agricultural sector declined to 15% in 1997, it remains important for 
Turkey’s economy since it employs 44% of the Turkish population. Turkey has a 
significant agricultural potential due to the size of its land resources and climatic 
features. In a vast variety of agricultural products such as tobacco, fhiits, vegetables,
90 “The Turkish Economy in 1998,” edition o f the Istanbul Chamber of Commerce, 1998, p.59. 
“ ‘TURKEY : Investors’ Guide,” p.37.
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grains, and forestry products Turkey has a major role. These products are traditional 
agricultural export items of the country and Turkey is the main producer among the 
major countries dominating the world market Within the agricultural sector the 
Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP) has utmost importance. The GAP is aiming to 
improve the economy of the Southeastern part of Turkey by mobilizing the country’s 
water and soil resources . The GAP comprises dams, power plants, irrigation schemes, 
agriculture, urban and rural infrastructure. The region is expected to be an exporter of
93processed agricultural products.
Abundance of natural resources, geographical proximity to export markets,a large 
domestic market and a liberal economic policy followed by export-oriented 
industrialization enabled Turkey’s industry to gain competitive strength. In 1997,the 
industrial sector, which includes metals, iron, steel, chemicals, petroleum refining, 
electronics and electrical equipment, food and tobacco processing and textiles, 
accounted for 25% of the country’s GNP. The manufacturing industry has sustained an 
annual average growth rate of 6% since 1990. The Turkish textile and clothing 
industry is one of the most important manufacturing sectors in the Turkish economy in 
terms of GDP, employment and exports . In 1998 , the sector had a share of around 
37% in total exports of the country. The Turkish iron and steel industry has shown 
great progress in the last fifteen years, both in terms of quality and capacity .Today, 
1.6% of the world’s crude steel production is realized in Turkey, while the exports of 
the iron and steel industry reached 8.4% of the total exports of Turkey in 1999. 
Turkey, also, has a well-established petrochemical and fertilizer industry, while with 
the installation of vehicle factories in the country, the autoparts industry has grown
^  “The Mediterranean Policy o f the EU and the Prospects for the Greek Industry,” published by SEB 
(Federation o f Greek Industries), March 1997, p. 88.
93 ‘Recent Developments in Turkish Economy,” p. 13.
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rapidly. Finally, Turkey is one of the major cement and chromite producing and 
exporting countries
One of the major sectors in Turkey’s economy,that contributes significantly to foreign 
exchange earnings and the balance of payments, is tourism . With over 7,000 kilometers 
of coastline and four seas, with a rich historical and cultural inheritance and a variety 
of natural assets Turkey is of the most popular places to visit. In 1997, it is 
estimated that the number of foreign tourists coming to Turkey rose to 7,7 million 
and tourism revenues totaled US $ 6,3 billion
Finally, with regard to the Turkish financial system, we can say that it is mainly 
dominated by the banking system. Turkish finance is principally founded upon a 
universal banking system and related areas like insurance, leasing, factoring and stock 
brokerage. Banks operate in accordance with international rules and practices, offering 
a wide variety of services. By the end of 1998, the number of banks operating in 
Turkey was 75. Of the 75 banks,60 are commercial banks and 15 are 
development and investment banks,while 18 have foreign bank participation .In 
addition, 29 Turkish banks have individual or joint equity participations in banks and 
other financial institutions in countries around Europe, Middle East and Central Asia.’^
Today, Turkey is going through another period of transformation, perhaps the most 
important in her recent history since its foundation in 1923. She has to upgrade her 
social, political and economic structures in order to reach European standards and
94„
95
96
Ankara-Promising Sectors” (http://www.balcantrade/turkey) , p.7. 
See Pan. Kazakos & Pan. Kiargovas, p.56.
See “TURKEY:Investors’ Guide,” p. 34.
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to gain the much desired status of a modem European country. Euro-oriented 
political and economic reforms can help the country to find its Western way.
TABLE 7
Origins of Gross Domestic Product 1997 % of total
Agriculture, forestry, fishing 15,1
Industry 25,0
Construction _______________________ M ____________
Services 53,9
GDP at factor cost 100.0
TABLE 8
Components of Gross Domestic Product 1997 % of total
Private consumption 68,8
Government consumption 12,1
Gross fixed investment 26,1
Stockbuilding & statistical discrepancies -1,0
Exports o f good and services 24,3
Imports o f goods and services -30,3
GDP a t m arket prices 100.0
Sm
TABLE 9
Principal Imports 1997 $m
Clothing & textiles 9,110 Mechanical & electrical machinerv 12,596
Iron , steel & metals 3,992 Minerals 6,337
Vegetables, fiuits & nuts 2,415 Transport vehicles 5,535
Processed food & tobacco 2,079 Chemicals 4,764
Transport vehicles 788 Iron, steel & metals 4,380
Minerals 625 Spiiming materials 2,395
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TABLE 10
M ain destinations o f  exports 1997 % o f  total M ain origins o f  imports % o f  total
Germany 20,0 Germany 16,5
Russia 7.9 Italy 9,3
u s 7,6 u s 8,6
UK 5,7 Russia 6,2
Italy 5,3 UK 5,7
France 4,4 France 2,2
EU 46,6 EU 51,5
Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1999 (EIU Country report 1” quarter 1999)
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CHAPTER IV
THE GREEK-TURKISH ECONOMIC COOPERATION : PROBLEMS
AND PROSPECTS
4.1. A Travelogue in the Recent History of the Greek-Turkish Economic Relations
Despite the fact that Turkey and Greece are two neighbors sharing similar cultural 
and social features, they have not been able to establish a constructive dialogue for a 
long time due to deep-rooted conflicts. The political obstacles and strains aggravate 
bilateral relations creating a climate of uncertainty and hostility and, as a result, both 
countries have missed great opportunities to develop contacts and cooperation.
A step toward bringing a Greek-Turkish dialogue to life was taken at the end of 
January 1988 in Davos, Switzerland, during a meeting between the then Greek Prime 
Minister Andreas Papandreou and his Turkish counterpart Turgut Ozal. At Davos, the 
need for an improvement of the bilateral relations was declared, especially through 
business channels and circles. To this end, in January 1988, in Davos, businessmen 
who represented 91 Greek and Turkish companies signed agreements for various 
activities concerning the business sector. In May 1988, a group of Turkish 
entrepreneurs, joined by Turgut Ozal, visited Greece where they had the opportunity 
to interchange ideas in a positive spirit with Greek business circles
Both sides agreed to initiate a joint forum in order to bring their business sectors
97 “ Greek-Turkish Relations,” (Special edition^ Industrial Review .(January 1998).
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frequently into contact, with the understanding that cooperation serves for the benefit 
of both Greek and Turkish entrepreneurs. As a result, the “Greek-Turkish Business 
Council” was established. The Council examined all the possibilities for cooperation 
between the two countries and drew up a list of initiatives that could be undertaken 
in the commercial sector. That way Greece and Turkey managed to inaugurate a 
significant “commercial friendship” , follov^ng the words of Abraham Lincoln, “borders 
that goods do not cross armies may” Despite the political tensions and the fact that 
the two economies are more competitive than supplementary, since they produce 
similar products, the bilateral trade volume, first reached the level of 108 
million dollars in 1988, and over the course of ten years it has gone up to 
million dollars (1999). This was not proportional to the economic and 
cooperation possibilities of the two countries, but considering the political tension it
was not negligible at a ll.98
With this in mind,the long-term goal of the Greek-Turkish Business Council was and 
still is to define the processes toward the development of economic cooperation in a 
way that would force the political world to act within the framework set by 
businessmen. Joint business action can bring not only profit for both sides but also 
the necessary bed for the development of social and political synergy ^ .
The Customs Union between the EU and Turkey ( 1/1/1996) resulted in some drastic 
changes with regard to the Turkish imports regime,as the tariffs were reduced and 
there was a stable progressive opening of Turkish markets and economy. Although the
Interview with Mr. P. Papaiexopoulos (ex-president o f TITAN Company/ex-president o f the Greek- 
Turkish Business Council), 28 January 1999, Athens.
^  Interview with Mr. P. Koutsikos (president o f ERGO Company/Greek head o f the Greek-Turkish 
Business Council), 25 January 1999, Athens.
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opening of the agreement occurred at the same time with the January 1996 crisis 
(see chapter 1, pg. 15), an event that once more brought on tension between the two 
neighbors, the businessmen gained from this agreement : Greek exports to Turkey 
increased by 200 million dollars within two years (1995-97), while at the same time 
Turkish exports to Greece noted some increase. In 1996, the bilateral trade
volume reached the level of 585 million dollars.100
But the Ocalan affair (February 1999) caused a “black hole” in the bilateral economic 
relations, when, on 26 February, 1999 , the Turkish president of the Greek- 
Turkish Business Coimcil, Rahmi K oç, took the decision to discontinue the workings 
of the Council. In addition,a boycott in Turkey against Greek products was set in .“^ '
In the summer of 1999, the Greek-Turkish relations entered a new e ra .
The two Foreign Ministers, Georgios Papandreou and Ismail Cem, decided to initiate a 
constructive “ Dialogue Process” on secondary fields, such as trade and economy, 
tourism, investments, and transportation (see chapter 2 , pg. 22-23), aiming to develop 
an atmosphere of cooperation between the two countries. Encouraged by the “green 
light” of the two governments and the flourishing of bilateral relations, the level of 
contacts among the private firms and non-governmental organizations of the two 
countries increased rapidly. Now there is a remarkable number of private companies, 
especially small and medium-sized enterprises wishing to establish various forms of 
cooperation with their counterparts. The Greek-Tiirkish Business Council started to re­
operate on 2 September, 1999,and an increase in the bilateral trade volume was 
recorded at the second-half of 1999.'*^^
KathimerinL(25 May 1997). 
Kerdos (31 December 1999).
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The meetings of the Council and the contacts between the business environments have 
become more frequent than ever. On 22 November, 1999, a delegation of the 
Federation of Turkish Industries ( TÜSIAD) visited Athens and had a meeting with the 
Greek Minister of Economy while the meeting of the Greek-Turkish Business 
Council held in Istanbul on 25 and 26 February 2000, brought approximately 200 
Greek and Turkish businessmen together. Within the framework of the Business 
Council, “Working Groups” such as banking, insurance, stock exchange, construction, 
tourism , trade and industry, and shipping were established. Moreover, both sides 
decided to initiate a joint campaign to eliminate the negative conditioning against one 
another’s products in the Turkish and Greek markets, develop corresponding banking 
relations, establish a joint investment bank and cooperate in the banking sector 
towards the Balkans and the Black Sea region.
The initiatives of establishing cooperation among the private sector firms and 
organizations have not only been confined to the Business Council meetings. The two 
countries have agreed to introduce one another’s business circles on various platforms. 
Under this context, a “Turco-Greek Frienship and Cooperation Fair” held in Athens, 
on 20-23 April 2000 where Greek and Turkish export producers had the opportunity 
to exhibit their products In addition, almost every month meetings and contacts 
between business circles, especially between local chambers have been taking place.
For instance, the Bursa’s (Turkey) Chamber of Commerce has signed a fraternal 
protocol with the Thessaloniki’s (Greece) Chamber of Conunerce, and on 2-3 June,
102
103
104
ODCONOMIKOS TAHYDROMOS (30 November 1999). 
To vima (26 February 2000).
Hürriyet (21 April 2000).
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2000 , a meeting between the Izmir (Turkey) and Lesvos (Greece) Chambers of 
Commerce was held in Izmir. Greece and Turkey have also had the opportunity to 
exploit their cooperation potentials on the business sector through their participation in 
the Association of Balkan Chambers and the Euro-Chambers.
In the meantime, the first Greek-Turldsh joint enterprise was established in Romania, 
in April 2000 between the Greek Marinopoulos Company and the Turkish Fiba 
Holding. By putting together an investment of 500.000 dollars, the two firms became 
partners in Romania’s “Marks and Spencer” shopping center*® .^ Furthemore, the 
venture capital company of the Commercial Bank of Greece bought out 12.5% shares 
of the Turkish Isiklar Package Company (April 2000)'*^  ^ while the Turkish Finansbank 
entered into cooperation with the Greek Alpha Credit Bank and the National Bank of 
Greece.
Apart from trade and commerce-related activities, visits, contacts and concrete 
proposals for the enhacement of cooperation between the non-govemmental 
organizations, municipalities and local administrations have considerably increased 
recently. There has been an enormous number of applications from the tourism 
agencies of Turkey and Greece to establish cooperation in all possible aspects of 
tourism. Within the framework of the “Dialogue Process” , the “Working Group on 
Tourism” (see chapter 2 , pg. 22-23) underlined the importance of encouraging 
cooperation in the fields of yacht tourism as well as the exchange of information, 
promotional materials and vocational training and discussed the potential of
Interview with Mr. Ali Emre Yurdakul (Deputy Secretary General o f Turkish Association o f Trade
Chambers & Stock Markets), 12 June 2000, Ankara.
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cooperation in the areas of youth and faith tourism.109
4.2. The Bilateral Agreements on Trade and Cooperation
Ther is no doubt the Greek-Turkish economic relations has always been affected in 
the past by bilateral political disputes which cause a climate of tension and mutual 
distrust between the two peoples This negative political climate and the political and 
psychological taboo costituded the main burden for the development of a profitable 
economic cooperation, a certainty that crystallized into the insufficient number of 
bilateral cooperation agreements.
Some of the most important bilateral cooperation agreements are: l)The Cultural 
Agreement, 1951 ;2)The Air Transport Agreement, 1951 ;3)The Railway Agreement, 
1954 ; 4) The Road Transport Agreement, 1970 ; 5) The Tourism Cooperation 
Agreement, 1979 ; 6) Agreement for the illicit drug trafficking, 1989.*’°
Within the framework of the Greek-Turkish rapprochment, the two Foreign Ministers, 
during their visits in each other’s country (January 20,2000 and February 3,2000 
respectively), signed nine bilateral agreements concerning economic relations, tourism , 
protection of the environment and education. The agreements recently signed a re :
1) Agreement on the protection of citizens, which provides for the countering of 
terrorist acts, the production of illicit drugs, illegal arms trading, illegal immigration, 
and money laundering.
109-
no
Interview with Mr. Ercüment E nç, 20 June 2000, Ankara. 
See Panos Kazakos & Panos Liargovas , p. 62.
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2) Agreement on mutual promotion and protection of investment, which provides for 
the promotion and protection of investment that has been made either in Turkey
by Greek investors, or in Greece by Turkish investors. Money destined for investment 
will be allowed to move freely between the two states. The agreement will be in 
force for the next 10 years.
3) Agreement on tourism, which provides for the easing of the tourist flow between 
the two countries without compromising their national interests, through seminars, 
exchange visits, exhibitions of cultural and historical heritage in each other’s country, 
as well as cooperation in the area of yachting. Finally, a joint committee will oversee 
and work on the implementation of the agreement, which will have a five-year term .
4) Agreement on the protection of the environment and development. According to 
this agreement, the two sides will take joint action in various areas, such as forest 
fires, sea pollution and ecotourism.
5) Agreement on economic cooperation, which provides for the creation of a joint 
economic committee that will oversee and ease the development of economic ties, 
within the framework of the existing international obligations of the two parties. The 
committee will hold meetings in both countries and the agreement will be in force for 
the next five years.
6) Agreement on shipping, which is based on the principles of free and fair 
competition, and aims at ensuring the free access of Greek and Turkish merchant 
vessels to ports of the two countries.
7) Agreement on scientific and technological cooperation
69
8) Agreement on education
9) Agreement on cooperation and mutual assistance between customs authorities, 
which aims at creating a framework of cooperation between the customs authorities of 
the two countries in order research and counter customs violations. The agreement 
also aims at creating an accurate recording of the value of imported and exported 
goods. If one party deems that specific information may compromise national security, 
it can deny access to i t . The agreement has no time limit.
One of the agreements with major importance for the freeing and further development 
of the bilateral economic relations is the Agreement for the Double Tax Evasion, an 
agreement that has not been signed yet by the two parties. The two sides entered into 
negotiations concerning the signing of such an agreement in 1989,1995 and 2000, but 
still they have not managed to come to a unilateral arrangement.” '
Apart from these agreements, the “ Joint Transport Committee” met in Athens in 
December 1999 and a Protocol was concluded. Since then, regular bus lines 
between the cities of both countries have increased; regular railway connections 
between Istanbul and Thessaloniki have been established and the first tour was 
realized on January 20,2000. In addition, Turkish Airlines has started scheduling 
flights between Istanbul and Thessaloniki.” ^
Interview with Mr. Chris J. Lazaris ( First Counsellor of the Embassy o f Greece), 19 June 2000, 
Ankara.
"^Turkish Daily News ( 2 April 2000).
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4.3. The Bilateral Economic Relations
4.3.1. Trade
The table below shows that the Greek-Turkish total trade volume from 1993 to 1998 
displays an increase of almost 500 million dollars. The bilateral trade volume reached 
the level of 410 million dollars in 1995, with the opening of Customs Union in 1996 
increased to 521 million dollars and, finally grew to the amount of almost 700 
million dollars in 1998. Moreover, the value of Greek exports to Turkey increased 
from 149 million dollars in 1993 to 347 million dollars in 1998, resulting in a 200 
million dollars increase. Equally, Turkish exports to Greece rose from million dollars 
in 1993 to 363 million dollars in 1998, resulting in a 230 million dollars increase. 
The table also shows a decline in the bilateral trade volume for 1999 .Due to the 
unfortunate political conjuncture of the February 1999 (Ocalan crisis, see chapter 2 , pg. 
20) and the boycott against the Greek products, there was a fall (-13%) in the value 
of Greek exports to Turkey. However, this decline is expected to retard, since the 
bilateral relations entered an era of rapprochement. The recent positive evolutions in 
Greek-Turkish relations and the willingness of the two people to cooperate have 
encouraged the Greek and the Turkish businessmen to declare their intention to record 
a bilateral trade volume of 5 billion dollars by the year 2005
QIKONOMTKOS TAHYDRQMOS r 30 September 1999).
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TABLE 11
Year Exports Imports Trade Balance Trade Volume ExTIm.
1992 145.7 88.1 57.5 233.8 1.6
1993 118.2 120.5 -2.3 23S .7 0.9
1994 168.7 105.1 63.9 273.8 1.6
1995 209.9 200.7 9.2 410.6 1.0
1996 236.5 285.0 ^8.5 521.5 0.8
1997 298.2 430.8 -132.6 729.0 0.6
1998 369.2 319.7 49.5 688.9 1.1
1999 363.4 264.5 98.9 627.9 1.3
Source: Prime M inistry o f the TurkisIÍ R epublic: Undersecretariat fo r  Foreign Trade
Among the main export items of bilateral trade are textile-mill products together with 
fruits and vegetables (see table 12 below). With regard to the Table 12 Greece’s chief 
exports to Turkey comprise of cotton,raw skins,iron and steel, cement, mineral 
fuels, paper and plastic. The Greek cotton and raw skins have great exporting 
potentials. Many Turkish textile-mill and ready-made clothing factories buy these raw 
goods in order to fabricate articles of high quality, which are designed for exports to 
the markets of EU and USA. On the other hand, Turkey’s cardinal export products to 
Greece are vegetables and fruits, plastic, glass, mineral fuels and steel. The Turkish 
steel and the country’s big variety of industrial minerals and rich deposits of marble 
have a special interest for the Greek construction compames
The two countries produce similar articles and their economies can be characterized as 
competitive (see chapter 3 : table 2 &4 , pg. 46 and table 7&9, pg. 61). Greece and 
Turkey’s main export items, such as manufactures, tobacco and food compete 
each other in international markets (see table 13 below). Still, business circles 
stress that there are differences too , concerning the productivity, the labor cost, the 
profit-making process, the quality and the prices of the two countries’ products that
See Panos Kazakos & P. Liargovas, p.87.
72
consumers of the Greek-Turkish markets. Besides, the bilateral trade volume of 700 
million dollars indicates that there is a market for their articles to sell In addition, 
Greece is aware of the need for the vast Turkish market where Greece has the 
opportunity to promote her exporting products and services and from where she can 
expand her trade benefits to the markets of Central Asia and the Black Sea region. In 
the same vein, the Turkish market, which is going through a stage of rapid 
development ( see chapter 3 , pg.54-55), needs the Greek contribution in terms of 
trading and promotion for her goods as well as in terms of backing the development
process through investments. 116
The business circles of both countries underline that the main burdens on the 
development of bilateral trade and reasons for low economic performances are the 
political tensions and the climate of enmity and distrust between the two neighbors. 
Until recently, the labels, “made in Greece” or “made in Turkey”, on the end 
products was causing a consumers’ bias toward both countries’ exporting items, and 
the political disputes could not give guarantees to the Greek or Turkish businessmen
who wanted to operate trade in Turkey or Greece 117
For the development of the bilateral trade, emphasis is put on the importance of 
regular meetings and contacts between the Chambers of Commerce, Trades and 
Industry . In this framework, platforms like business fairs, commercial meetings and 
exhibitions, where the business world of Greece and Turkey can be introduced with 
the export products of each other, can contribute to the attraction of buyers and the 
increase of exports. The first effort toward this end, the Turkish Commercial Fair held
Interview with Mr. P. Koutsikos, 25 January 1999, Athens.
Interview with Mr. Ali Emre Yurdakul, 12 June 2000, Ankara.
‘ Interview with St. Manos (Ex-Minister o f the Greek Ministry of Finance/Member of the Greek 
Parliament), 1 February 1999, Athens.
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in Athens in April 2000 (see chapter 4 ,  pg.66) , was crowned with great success and it 
has already been decided that a similar Greek Commercial Fair will be repeated in 
Istanbul in May 2001'·*
TABLE 12
The main 
items of 
Greek 
exports
1000$ %
The main 
items of 
Turkish 
exports
1000$ %
Cotton 156,020 35.8 Articles of 
Steel
41,738 14.8
Mineral
fuels,
mineral
oils
69,413 15.9
Textile 
Articles; Sets; 
Worn 
Clothing
20,708 6.98
Tobacco
and
tobacco
substitutes
20,863 4.79
Edible fruits 
and nuts 14,833 5.00
Aluminium 14,353 3.29 Glass 10,827 3.65
Raw hides 
and Skins 7,245 1.66
Electrical
machinery
and
equipment
9,994 3.37
Electrical
machinery
and
equipment
5,095 1.17 Televisions 6,912 2.33
Iron and 
Steel 4,160 0.95
Edible
vegetables 6,796 2.29
Paper and 
Paper 
Board
3,714 0.85 Fish 5,210 1.76
Copper 3,150 0.72
Paper and 
Paper Board 4,852 1.64
Mineral 
fuels and 
Mineral 
oils
2,270 0.52 Tobacco 4,734 1.60
"^Interview with Mr. Sinan Aygiin(President o f Ankara Chamber o f Commerce), 1 June 2000, Ankara.
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TABLE 13
T he maiD item s o f  Turkish exports that com pete with the G reek ones in the international markets
COTTON TOBACCO
RAW HIDES AND SKINS ALUMINIUM
OLIVE OIL TEXTILE-MILL PRODUCTS
DAIRY PRODUCTS FERTILIZERS
FRUITS AND VEGETABLES SUGAR
STEEL FURNITURES
CEMENT CEREALS
Source : Panhellenic Exporters Association : Export Research Center 
43.2. Investments
in 1999, it was recorded that 32 Greek companies were operating in Turkey, either 
as direct investments or through representative offices. These companies’ share to the 
total capital of Turkey is 0.8 per thousand. Due to political reasons, it was not 
possible for the Turkish companies to operate through direct investments in the Greek 
market. Moreover, the Customs Union’s exemption for the free passage of labor force 
does not enable the infiltration of Turkish trade firms in Greece.
TABLE 14
SECTORS NUMBER OF 
COMPANIES
TOTAL CAPITAL (in 
Turkish Lira)
Agriculture 1 2,928
Mining 2 10.500
M anufacturing; 3 95,000
Tobacco products 1 69,000
Skins 1 16,000
Non-ferrous metals 1 10,000
Services: 26 118,011
Trade 11 49,439
Restaurants 2 5,520
Hotels 9 53,957
Air transports 1 35
Others 3 9,060
TOTAL 32 226,439
Source: Turkish Association o f Foreign Investors (YASED)/I999
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According to the table above, the Greek direct investments in the Turkish market are 
concentrated mainly in the service sector with 26 enterprises out of 32. The foreign 
trade firms comprise of 34% of the total Greek investments and 42% of the 
investments in the service sector while the 9 hotel businesses compose of 34.6% of 
the same sector and 28% of the total investments. The Greek investments in the 
sectors of manufacturing, mining and agriculture are few . With regard to the 
agricultural sector,there have been efforts toward upgrading the bilateral business 
through the participation of Greek exporters in the Turkish agricultural exhibition 
“Agrotec 99” (Ankara, 8-11/9/1999)and Turkish exporters in the Greek “Agrotica” 
(Thessaloniki, 29-30/11/1199).
On 20 December 1999, a major cooperation agreement between two construction 
companies, the Greek “METON-ETEP” and the Turkish “YAPI MERKEZİ” was 
signed. The agreement covers the establishment of a pipe-unit in Greece and has 
been recorded as the first common Greek-Turkish investment. In the same spirit, three 
companies of Greece and Turkey, the “ENELCO S.A.” , the “GAMA INDUSTRY & 
MONTAJ A.S.” and the “EXON POWER” , have signed an agreement aiming at the 
establishment of a natural gas unit in Greece. There is a considerable number of 
Greek construction companies that are interested in taking part in competitions 
concerning construction and infrastructure projects in Turkey These projects include 
the building of airports, ports and marines, motorways and land reclamation works. 
Taking into consideration that the construction sector is the driving force of the two 
economies, Turkish and Greek businessmen expressed the necessity of cooperation in
" ’ICerdosm  December 1999).
120 “Qfgejj.juj.iyjj, Economic Relations,” Memorandum of Board o f Foreign Economic Relations of 
Turkey (DEIK), Istanbul, February 2000, p. 11.
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this sector and underlined the fact that the reconstruction of Southeast Europe presents 
significant opportunities for such cooperation. Both sides also stated the fact that 
financial cooperation should be strengthened by the creation of joint regional funds.
The Greek businessmen take a special interest with what regards the investment 
sector in Turkey. This country, within the framework of a privatization procedure, 
implements modem patterns of pulling in foreign capital and its policy of “open 
doors” has attracted many European and American investors. For the foreign capitals 
and investments, there are no restrictions concerning the operations and the re­
investment of profits and shares. Moreover, in the Turkish Free Zones ( see chapter 3 , 
pg.58) investors are free to constmct their own premises and the tax system is quite 
attractive, with many tax exceptions and discounts. Greek investors have also 
expressed their wish to cooperate through investments in the agricultural sector and 
particularly, in the Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP) (see chapter 3 , pg.58)
4 3 3 . Tourism
Both countries’ natural and cultural attractions make the tourist industry an important 
component of their economies. The foreign currency inflows totaling almost 10 billion 
dollars for both countries make tourism also the most important foreign currency 
earner for Greece and Turkey. With this in mind, there had been some movements 
toward cooperation in the tourism sector between the two countries in the past. On 5 
June 1979 the two sides signed an agreement for tourist cooperation. This agreement
Industrial Review (March 2000). 
' “ Ibid.
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provided for annual meetings between the tourist delegations of Greece and Turkey. 
However, these meetings did not occurr due to tensions on bilateral relations. On 
9 March 1993, there was a meeting between Greek and Turkish businessmen and 
investors of the tourist sector. In this case, to o , the political climate was not in favor 
of promoting closer cooperation and contacts.
More recently, in May 1996, the Greek and the Turkish Associations of Travel 
Agencies, with the understanding that tourism was an important tool which could 
contribute to the improvement of bilateral relations, signed a cooperation 
agreement. Both sides agreed to form two committees, namely “Maritime Tourism 
Committee” and “Hoteliers and Travel Agencies Committee” , comprising of the 
representatives of the respective private sectors, which would discuss ways and means 
in order to increase cooperation in the tourism field. The proposals of each committee 
would be submitted for further consideration to their Governments.
Apart from the negative propaganda from the media,the bias and the political 
disputes, among the problems of the bilateral tourist relations is also the visa issue. 
The Greek side requires visa from the Turkish visitors to Greece, while this 
requirement does not apply for the Greek tourists to Turkey.
In the framework of the ongoing Turkish-Greek dialogue,a Tourism Forum was 
organized in Bodrum(Turkey)on 16 October, 1999,by the Ministry of Tourism of the 
Republic of Turkey. In this Forum, the Greek and Turkish delegations of the 
Working Groups in tourism, expressed their deep satisfaction for the reduction of the
See Panos Kazakos & P. Liargovas, p. 58. 
Ib id , p.90.
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tension between the two countries. They also stressed the importance of maintaining 
the Aegean S e a -a  highly touristic region for both countries-as an area of peaceful 
co-existence. With the aim of turning the Aegean into a sea of friendship and 
cooperation, creative proposals have been made. These proposals includ close 
cooperation between Greek and Turkish Associations of the Hoteliers and the Travel 
Agencies aiming to increase the number of tourists in both countries, common holiday 
packages for Greek and Turkish coasts and islands in the Aegean Sea, for tourists 
from third countries and holiday schemes, comprising of youth from both countries 
( joint vacation on a weekly basis). Meetings, seminars and common training programs 
in the tourist sector, as well as enhancement of the a ir , land and maritime links
125between Greece and Turkey have also been proposed.
Visits, contacts and concrete proposals for developing closer ties in the tourism field 
have considerably increased, especially comparing the situation with the past. In March 
2000, the Tourism Investors’ Association (TYD) of Turkey had a meeting with Greek 
entrepreneurs in the fi:amework of the International Eastern Mediterranean Tourism 
Fair held in Thessaloniki, Greece. The discussions held between the two sides 
produced a concrete shortlist of future plans. Among the plans were the creation of a 
working group from both sides which can carry out the task of establishing and 
developing bilateral tourism relations on the Aegean cost and the mutual exchange of 
know-how and experience on tourism issues. Another suggestion was the possibility of 
joint tourism investments in third countries.
“ Report on Greek-Turkish Tourist Cooperation” Ministry o f Tourism of the Republic of 
Turkey/Department of External Relations, Ankara, June 2000.
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Add to these plans for promoting the positive climate between the two people is a 
project aimed at restoring churches and example buildings in Kaya village,a village 
located on the southwest coast of Turkey which was inhabited by Greeks before the 
Greek-Turkish War of 1922. The project has been set up under the leadership of the 
Turkish Association of Travel Agencies ( TURSAB) with contributions from the 
Turkish Chamber of Architect Halls, and it is expected to attract a large number of
visitors from Greece and elsewhere.126
4.4. The Obstacles of the Greek-Turkish Economic Cooperation
Business and political circles from both countries underline that the cardinal 
disincentive for the development of economic cooperation has been until today the 
negative political climate. Although the Greek and Turkish businessmen have tried to 
create a bridge of friendship between the two countries through commerce-related 
channels, the ups and downs in the political arena have always blocked their efforts. 
The enmity feelings and the hereditary bias between the two peoples and the political 
tensions, which from time to time stirred up the hatred, have been the iceberg that
sinks any effort to develop cooperation schemes.127
With regard to the bilateral political relations, in the course of almost 30 years, there 
have been cycles of tension occasionally reaching peaks of crisis (July-August 1974, 
March 1987, January 1996 and February 1999) bordering on the threshold of warfare. 
This situation could not create the appropriate and necessary conditions and the secure
Turkish Daily News ( 2 April 2000).
Interview with Mr. St. M w o s, 1 February 1999, Athens.
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environment needed for the activation of business circles and the realization of
investments.
The mutual distrust and the negative political climate acted also as a brake on what 
concerns the freeing and fostering of trade relations. Greece was not issuing visa 
easily, and she was not issuing visa for multiple travels at a ll. Moreover, there was 
no legal basis to facilitate trade operations and border crossings. In that framework, 
businessmen from both countries insist on the need for sigmng a bilateral agreement
concerning the double taxation issue.128
4.5.The Potentials of the Greek-Turkish Economic Cooperation
During most of the past two millenium, the area now comprising Greece and Turkey 
was the economic powerhouse of the world. A partnership of almost 90 million 
people, with direct political and economic investments in what accounts for half of 
Eurasia, situated on the cross-roads of the world’s energy flows, having at its service 
the first merchant fleet in the world, participating in the mightiest economic and 
military coalitions in history, could soon become the locomotive for regional growth, 
at least.
Turkey could contribute to her big internal market and her position on the outskirts of 
the Caucasus and Middle-East oil producing regions. Greece has to offer her EU
Interview with Mr. P. Papalexopoulos, 28 January 1999, Athens.
81
know-how, a banking system fully integrated to Europe’s , her colossal merchant fleet 
and far-flung connections, her own experience, as a mature and advanced economy 
and society.
Greece also looks to Turkey as to a real partner, with whom she will work over a 
time-scale extending into the foreseeable future, not just as an opportunity market,
129from which she will grab some fat contracts.
Both countries operate in the same geographic area, have more or less supplementary 
business interests and strong will to prosperity. By using these conditions through 
joint action in market and economy, their bilateral trade and financial relations can 
reach a high standard of efficiency. Beyond the bilateral cooperation, Greece and 
Turkey have also the potential to expand their joint economic visions and projects in 
the Balkans, the Middle Asia and the Black Sea region.
The fostering of intra-industry trade can positively influence the increase the 
competitive power of both countries’ export items. In particular, the Greek and the 
Turkish businessmen can cooperate for the production and marketing of automobiles, 
tyres , glass, iron and steel, electronics, manufactured machines, energy, building 
materials, metallurgy and mining, fertilizers, textile and food. Joint-action can also be 
established in the areas of the telecommunications, information systems as well as in 
the naval production and reparation sector. As for this last sector, the Turkish naval 
arsenals are ready to offer their services to the Greek ship-owners in attractive prices. 
In addition, the Turkish yacht production industry is discussing cooperation with its
Interview with the Greek Ambassador in Turkey since 1999 Mr. loannis Korantis , 19 June 2000, 
Ankara.
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Greek counter-part. 130
The improvement of bilateral business environment in the trade sector 
encompasses issues, such as the efforts to undertake the necessary steps to keep the 
border gates open on a 24-hour basis, adopting regulations in order to eliminate the 
problems that arise during passport and customs controls and fostering trade between
seaports 131
Moreover, there are great potentials and bright prospects for the bilateral cooperation 
on the tourism sector, as Greece and Turkey are among the first 20 most tourist 
places of the world. By joining their forces through joint tourist organizations and 
common holiday packages and tours the Eastern Mediterranean region could be turned 
into the world’s number one tourist place. If Spain attracts 40 million tourists every 
year, a Greek-Turkish joint tourist market would have the capacity to receive and 
attract more than 100 million tourists per year In that case, the Eastern Mediterranean 
region will attain also to economic power and prosperity, too .
Various initiatives and joint projects on the banking and stock market sector, efforts 
for environment protection of the Aegean and Black Sea region and fostering 
cooperation between small and medium-sized enterprises could also serve to the 
development of a new relationship on a qualitatively new basis.
See DEIK Report, February 2000, p. 14 . 
Ibid ,p.l5.
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Interview with Mr. Bulent Akarcalı (Vice-Chairman o f Motherland Party/ Member of the Turkish 
Parliament), 1 June 2000 , Ankara.
Interview with Mr. Türker Yılmaz ( member o f the Association of Young Businessmen and 
Industrialists o f Ankara), 23 June 2000 , Ankara.
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Apart from trade and commerce-related activities, other possible issues that have the 
potential to facilitate and enhance the existing cooperation includ joint projects 
on cultural exchanges. The establishment of school-twinning relations, youth camps, 
cooperation among the universities Joint participation in festivals and seminars and the 
exchange of summer course and research scholarships should help both people to get 
acquainted with each other. In the same vein, the revision, by a joint committee of 
experts, of all textbooks of Greek and Turkish schools and the deletion of unfriendly 
or hostile references would be necessary for the elimination of bias and unfriendly 
attitudes.
In broader terms, positive developments on culture and education sector could 
contribute to the facilitation of economic cooperation, since the psychological 
factor and, mainly, the lack of confidence and positive spirit between the two 
societies, affect to a large extent bilateral economic relations
The Turks and Greeks are alike in more ways than they are different, certainly on a 
people to people basis. Until politicians and propagandists can rein in venomous 
rhetoric, the problems will remain. In that respect, frequent contacts and meetings 
between the members of the two parliaments is a must for further 
rapprochement. There must be an adequate communication in all directions, a 
communication that will generate trust and cooperation between the two parties in 
order to resolve peacefully and diplomatically their serious differences. Greeks and 
Turks must learn how to live together, as French and Germans d id . If countries like
Interview with Prof. Dr. Mehmet Sağlam ( Vice-Chairman True Path Party o f Turkey), 23 June 2000, 
Ankara.
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France and Germany, two implacable enemies during the World War I I , learned how 
to surmount their deadly hatred and cooperate in the EU’s framework, then it should 
be possible for countries like Greece and Turkey to overcome their mutual distrust 
and to show the international community that they know how to cooperate and to 
coexist peacefully when there is common aim
Business can emerge as a big success story of the bilateral relations. The 
increase of contacts and trade operations together with the implementation of concrete 
joint projects and investments can serve as new and solid background for the new 
type of bilateral relations. The gradual building of a mutual economic relationship 
should pave the way for opening new paths for new attitudes toward the deep-rooted 
bilateral disputes and will lead to greater economic prosperity for all people in the
region.136
Ministers Papandreou and Cem by initiating the “Dialogue Process” opened a door of 
opportunity for their peoples. The two countries, keeping the national positions but 
leaving aside all the sensitive issues,tried to learn about each other and to get 
beyond psychological taboos. The initial aim was the creation of a positive political 
climate, which could gradually help Greece and Turkey to deal with the hard political
issues.137
Private business is an important factor for strengthening the Greek-Turkish ties, but 
not the only one. No nation solely relies on business contacts in its relations with
Interview with Mr. Bülent Akarcalı, 1 June 2000, Ankara.
Interview with Prof. Dr. Theodoros Couloumbis (Department o f Intematioiud Relations, University of 
Athens), 15 January 1999, A thens.
'^^To vim ai 12 March 2000).
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other nations . In fact, foreign policy is exercised by national Governments, according 
to the mandate conferred upon them by their respective electorates. At the present 
stage Greece and Turkey must keep up the momentum built since Helsinki and the 
visits by Ministers Papandreou and Cem to the respective capitals. The process 
followed so far, has served the two countries all w ell. So , if they keep on this track, 
although it will require patience, steadiness and serious, hard work, their prospects are 
good and will get brighter every day.*^®
138 Interview with the Greek Ambassador in Turkey, Mr. loannis Korantis, 19 June 2000, Ankara.
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CONCLUSION
The thesis tries to evaluate an understanding of the new type of relation between 
Greece and Turkey that flourished just a few months before the dawn of the 21®* 
century. The thesis also depicts the process that led from the Greek-Turkish 
“monologue” to the Greek-Turkish “dialogue” .
Since 1988 the business circles of Greece and Turkey have focused their efforts 
toward creating a bridge of contact, friendship and respect between the two countries. 
The concept was that the two ancient enemies could become modem partners. The 
businessmen have tried to establish trade relations, and they have been successful 
enough, despite the slippery ground of the bilateral political disputes. In 1999, almost 
ten years later, this concept of economic cooperation remained the basis for the 
Greek-Turkish rapprochement.
The diplomatic effort for a Greek-Turkish cooperation was set out during the Kosovo 
Crisis, when the two countries worked together on a humanitarian basis. In June 1999, 
the two Foreign Ministers, Papandreou and Cem, excavated the foundations of a peace 
process, which gained momentum by two devastating earthquakes and the Helsinki’s 
decision, which is moving ahead at a quick pace.
The myth of the “eternal Greek-Turkish enmity” seems to suffer a lethal blow, as the 
two countries engage in strengthening economic ties and enhancing business
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cooperation. The building of a mutual economic relation can allow for the climate 
between the two neighbors to better, while the even development of the cooperation 
will be useful in dealing with the complicated bilateral issues.
As things are now developing, the question is how best and faster to build a lasting 
and exemplary relationship, based on fnendship and mutual understanding and respect. 
Mutual interests can be advanced which will lead to greater economic prosperity for 
all people in the region and to a genuine and long-desire peace. After a ll , economic 
“Siamese twins” cannot kill each other because they will be bleeding at the same 
tim e.
In this context, the business communities of Greece and Turkey have a very important 
role to play. By accelerating joint action in the most significant economic areas, they 
can be the architectures of a Greek-Turkish relation on a qualitative basis. By creating 
an economically powerful joint bloc, they can influence to a large extent political 
decisions. But, they cannot bring forward any political solutions ; they cannot make 
political decisions ; they cannot shape or re-shape national positions . Decisions 
regarding settlement on Greek-Turldsh political relations are made by the respective 
Governments.
Given the current situation of Greek-Turkish relations, as projects on issues-areas 
leading to mutual benefits are mounted and carried out successfully, they are certain 
to improve the atmosphere of confidence so necessary for the peace process to 
continue unfolding.
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